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The Crisis Of Retirement And Facing Old Age

This essay will explore the ideas of Simone de Beauvoir on the crisis of retirement and facing old age.

As French philosopher Simone de Beauvoir observes, if old age is not to become an absurd parody of our former lives, there is only one solution: to continue to pursue ends that give our existence a meaning.

The issue of what awaits us at the conclusion of our working lives is one that has been the subject of much debate. For the French philosopher Simone de Beauvoir, retirement can be regarded less as a reward and more as an existential rupture: an event that causes the world to view us differently, and thus has the potential to alienate us from ourselves.

Western capitalist societies in particular tend to attach value to an individual's productivity, and they especially champion the cheap labour and technological nativism of youth.

In the contemporary economic paradigm, individuals who do not align with the prevailing norms and standards of profitability may find themselves marginalised and irrelevant. It is imperative to marginalise these individuals, as their contributions to the global community have reached their zenith.

The crisis experienced by some individuals upon retirement constitutes a component of the comprehensive social process of 'othering' that is imposed on the ageing population in general, as Beauvoir observes. The author posits that individuals tend to eschew self-identification as 'old'.

Society tends to perceive advanced age as a disgraceful and sensitive topic that is considered improper to discuss.

In contrast to the unpredictable nature of death, which can occur at any moment, Beauvoir proposes that "age is distanced from us by a span of time so vast that it becomes indistinguishable from eternity: such a distant future appears to defy reality."

Indeed, given that death is synonymous with nothingness, it poses a lesser threat to our identity than old age does.

This void can induce a metaphysical sense of vertigo, yet it is reassuring in its simplicity — it does not engender any difficulties. The assertion is made that the subject will no longer be in existence. In the context of such an occurrence, the individual's sense of self remains intact. The act of conceptualising oneself as an aged individual at a time when one is actually in their youth can be considered as a form of self-identity substitution, whereby one adopts the identity of another person.

The concept of advanced age as a looming calamity is a poignant one, for it is the contrast with life rather than death that is emphasised. Age is thus depicted as a parody of life itself.

From a societal perspective, the elderly are often viewed in a dichotomous manner, characterised by either the serenity of wizened sages, who are revered as transcendent spirits between life and death, or, more commonly, as senile and infirm individuals. In either case, they are distinguished from humanity: they are Othered.

This analysis is offered by Beauvoir in her 1970 work, The Coming of Age. She examines the oppression of the elderly with the same unwavering rigour with which she evaluates the situation of women in her more renowned 1949 book, The Second Sex.

A curious aspect of societal attitudes towards the elderly is the self-denial that appears to be at its core. As Beauvoir outlines, the options are stark: either to die early or to grow old. However, the process of Othering the elderly is so thorough that we tend to ignore the fact of ageing as something that will ever impact us personally.

This societal marginalisation is so profound that it can be internalised, leading to a state of self-rejection. The individual, in their old-fashioned state, becomes oblivious to their own identity.

The rejection of the process of aging by many individuals can be interpreted as an expression of 'bad faith', as described by existentialist thinkers such as Beauvoir. Bad faith can be defined as a form of self-deception, manifesting in two distinct ways.

Firstly, the pre-given 'facticity' of our lives may be denied: that is to say, the reality of our existence, our origins, and the boundaries of what is realistic for us may be questioned.

Secondly, the concept of 'freedom' in this context is not to be taken lightly. It pertains to the ability to act, to become, and to realise possibilities.

The human condition is characterised by a perpetual oscillation between facticity and freedom. To resolve this tension, there is a tendency to deny either aspect of this duality: the individual is compelled to deny both their factual nature and their potential for freedom.

The refusal to acknowledge the onset of ageing can be regarded as a form of bad faith that is characterised by a denial of reality. By treating the elderly as a foreign species, by pushing away 'old age' as something that only ever happens to others, the not-yet-old slip into an absurd kind of deception and inauthenticity towards their own lives.

This kind of bad faith can persist for decades — until one day, external forces compel us to confront it. The phenomenon under discussion may be conceptualised as a fall, an illness, or the manifestation of a wrinkled face upon reflection in a mirror.

Beauvoir recollects her own astonishment at the unexpected manner in which the universal passage of time had also been carrying her along:

I recall my own astonishment when I was gravely ill for the first time in my life and I thought to myself, 'This woman they are carrying on a stretcher is me.'

However, it should be noted that the process of aging can be accompanied by a number of challenges, with one of the most significant being the experience of retirement.

The transition to retirement can be likened to the transformation of a productive human being into a pensioner in the blink of an eye. The economy has expressed gratitude for one's contributions, and it is now time to make way for new developments. Furthermore, it is imperative to emphasise the necessity of retiring with decorum. It must be acknowledged that, by virtue of advanced age, individuals have transitioned from the dynamic and tumultuous milieu of human existence. It may be advisable to consider horticultural pursuits as a viable option, given the circumstances.

Those who have retired from a capitalist economic system are required to address a series of inquiries that have the potential to precipitate a crisis of confidence. In the event of an individual's transition from the workforce, the question of the purpose and value of life becomes a salient one.

The past has been rendered static, and the future appears to be constrained. Consequently, the question arises of what the subsequent phase will entail, in the context of a managed decline. The question is posed of whether the subject has been relegated to a state of desolation and abandonment. Is this the end for the vehicle? The question arises as to whether the designation 'old person' is the only possible label for this individual. This raises the question of whether this is the full extent of the situation.

Following a lifetime of denying reality through deceitful means and disregarding the inevitability of the ageing process, retirees are now confronted with the pervasive ageism that such dishonesty engenders.

If the term 'old' is perceived to be synonymous with a state of degradation or decline, then conditions are conducive to older people viewing themselves in this manner. This approach, however, is not without its limitations, as it can, at times, result in a form of self-censorship and the imposition of restrictions on one's potential actions and expressions. The assertion that an individual is too advanced in years to engage in a particular activity, whether that be donning a certain garment, embarking on a journey, or attempting a new endeavour, is a common one. As Beauvoir asserts:

Should elderly individuals exhibit comparable aspirations, sentiments and necessities to those of younger demographics, the global community often responds with revulsion. Love and jealousy are perceived as abhorrent, sexuality as distasteful, and violence as absurd.

The phenomenon of facticity-denying bad faith exhibited by the not-yet-old population consequently gives rise to the freedom-denying bad faith demonstrated by the already-old demographic. The elderly population is susceptible to social alienation, which can lead to a state of internalised alienation.

The solution to this issue is yet to be determined. The objective of this study is to explore the potential for individuals to liberate themselves from the constraints imposed by false beliefs surrounding concepts such as work, retirement and the process of ageing.

When human value is inextricably linked to one's professional status, as Beauvoir observes, it becomes evident that the absence of employment in later years can lead to profound feelings of isolation, loneliness, and self-doubt.

The contemporary workplace often engenders a sense of perpetual striving, fostering the perception of a future accomplishment that is both alluring and aspirational. Conventional milestones such as marriage, purchasing a property, and childbirth serve to reinforce this grand narrative arc.

However, the transition to retirement often accompanied by the disconcerting implication that one's contributions and efforts have been rendered futile. The machine continues to operate, expelling its obsolete components alongside the thoroughfare. As Beauvoir asserts:

It is a poignant realisation that, at a given moment, an individual may come to understand that their life has reached its conclusion, and that their remaining journey will lead them solely to their final resting place. He has achieved a significant level of success; however, it is important to note that this can be followed by a decline. In the words of Yeats, 'Life is a long preparation for something that never happens'. There is a juncture at which one realises that one is no longer preparing for any eventuality, and one comprehends that the notion of progressing towards a goal was a fallacy. Our personal history had presumed that it possessed an end, and now it is indisputable that this finality has been removed.

While this realisation is frequently disturbing, and at times even devastating, Beauvoir theorises that, under the appropriate conditions, it can also act as a catalyst for longer-term authenticity and joy. The advanced years are characterised by a multitude of substantial benefits that are often overlooked.

Indeed, even in the context of Othering and ageism, some individuals nevertheless experience retirement as a significant source of personal liberation. Consequently, individuals are no longer compelled to engage in behaviours that serve the pursuit of career advancement, the enhancement of reputation within a specific social or professional circle, or the augmentation of financial resources for retirement purposes.

This process of discarding preconceived notions and illusions represents a significant contribution of this period.

One potential strategy to address the negative perceptions associated with ageing is to critically examine the opportunities it presents. Indeed, employment is no longer a viable option; however, there are other potential avenues to explore. The ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle propounded the notion that human excellence is best expressed not through work, but through leisure.

Contrary to popular belief, retirement need not be regarded as a crisis of identity. Indeed, it may be viewed as a rite of passage to a more authentic way of life. Individuals have the capacity to direct their attention towards activities that they find genuinely stimulating, such as grandparenthood and family life, the establishment of communities, the development of new skills, and the acquisition of knowledge in areas that they previously lacked the opportunity to explore.

In summary, the cultivation of human qualities is paramount.

As Beauvoir writes, "There is only one solution if old age is not to be an absurd parody of our former life."

It is imperative to pursue endeavours that bestow meaning upon our existence. Such pursuits may encompass devotion to individuals, groups, or causes; social, political, intellectual, or creative endeavours; or any other pursuit that is conducive to the fulfilment of our human condition.

In the context of preparing for retirement, financial security is undoubtedly a primary concern. However, it is imperative to recognise that ensuring financial stability is merely one aspect of a comprehensive retirement preparation. The importance of securing adequate housing and engaging in fulfilling hobbies should not be overlooked. Furthermore, it is imperative to consider the commitments, pursuits and projects that will sustain us until the conclusion of our lives.

A more transitional or phased approach to retirement, coupled with the ongoing decoupling of our identities from work irrespective of age, may prove effective in facilitating this transition.

It is imperative to engage in perpetual introspection, not merely at the culmination of one's professional journey, to ascertain our fundamental aspirations in life. We must endeavour to meticulously arrange our lives in accordance with these aspirations well in advance of our eventual transition from professional endeavours for monetary gain.

However, it must be acknowledged that this may not be a viable option for a significant proportion of the population. Within a culture that defines its citizens by their professional activities, it can appear to be challenging to engage with or explore other domains. It is important to acknowledge that not all individuals have the opportunity to identify and cultivate their passions.

It is possible that an individual may be managing financially on a pay-to-pay basis, or may be employed within an industry that offers limited opportunities for career progression beyond the immediate role, or may have dependents to support. Upon retirement, the subjects of this study are confronted with a desolate and barren environment, a metaphorical landscape of lives that never flourished.

Beauvoir asserts that the collective failures of society are embodied by the profound sense of isolation and rejection experienced by these individuals. The Coming of Age is a clarion call for societal transformation, aimed at ensuring that elderly individuals are not marginalised or marginalised by economic structures, but rather, they are accorded a meaningful place in everyday life. This transformation is predicated on the recognition of the value of their experiences and the facilitation of avenues through which they can articulate their innermost sentiments, share the intricacies and nuances of their lived experiences, and commemorate their full and uninterrupted humanity.

It is imperative for younger demographics to acknowledge that the manner in which society treats the elderly is indicative of the manner in which the world will treat them. Beauvoir's argument is that it is not possible to dehumanise those with whom we are destined to become.

It is imperative that we cease to engage in acts of dishonesty; the very essence of our existence is at stake in the future that awaits us. It is not possible to ascertain one's identity in the absence of knowledge regarding one's future self. It is therefore recommended that individuals recognise themselves in other people, whether male or female, of advanced age.

The notion of adornment in one's senior years is not merely an expression of pride but rather a form of resistance against a societal preoccupation with the notion of youth. This resistance is particularly pertinent in the context of contemporary discourse surrounding work, retirement, and the ageing process.

As individuals age, they are subject to physical changes and challenges. However, these changes do not necessarily have to be accompanied by feelings of social or existential alienation. The absence of a definitive, glorious destination in our lives does not, in itself, negate the possibility of our lives being imbued with purpose and value through our engagement in projects that contribute to the betterment of the world. This notion is encapsulated by Beauvoir's assertion:

The most favourable circumstance for the elderly individual is to have a fulfilling array of projects that keep them occupied and engaged, thus avoiding both ennui and physical deterioration. The temporal periods in which he resides are under his own personal jurisdiction, and he is not obliged to adopt the defensive or aggressive behavioural patterns that are frequently observed in the latter years. His advanced age is not remarked upon.

Indeed, under optimal conditions, and when presented with a life replete with purposeful activities and relationships, advanced age has the potential to be the most fulfilling and genuine period of life.

However, Beauvoir concedes that if an individual's experience does not align with this, it should not be construed as a personal deficiency. The prospect of dignity in old age is greatly diminished when there is an absence of dignity in the work individuals are compelled to perform in order to attain it.

In order for this to be the case, it is necessary for him to have committed himself to undertakings that set time at defiance in his middle age. In our society of exploitation, this possibility is refused to the vast majority of human beings.

It is evident that a complete release from the prevailing notion of bad faith surrounding the process of ageing will necessitate a substantial upheaval in the prevailing economic system.

Throughout history, other cultures have demonstrated a profound respect for the life experience and wisdom of the elderly, allocating them significant roles and places within society.

In contemporary Western society, however, the prevailing societal paradigm continues to prioritise the evaluation of an individual's worth based on their productivity and profitability. This approach engenders a societal mindset that treats people as economic units to be exploited and discarded. Consequently, the fear and revilement of old age persists, and those who experience it encounter existential challenges that extend beyond mere physical decline.

What We Learn From Loss

Michael Cholbi's discourse on the subjects of grief, identity crises, and the lessons we derive from loss.

Michael Cholbi, a philosopher, posits that grief is not an irrational emotion but rather a multifaceted, dynamic process that entails a profound reformation of our identities. Grief is a natural and often debilitating response to loss. However, it is also an integral component of a fulfilling life.

In his 2022 book Grief: In his work A Philosophical Guide, Michael Cholbi posits that philosophers throughout history have devoted comparatively little attention to the subject of grief.

It is possible that this phenomenon may be attributable to a sense of embarrassment. According to Cholbi, ancient philosophers from Greece and Rome were generally inclined to prioritise reason over emotion. The expression of grief for the deceased can be seen as a manifestation of the latter, representing a malady or weakness that is to be endured or, alternatively, rationalised.

As the Stoic philosopher Epictetus asserts in the Enchiridion:

The pursuit of immortality for oneself, one's spouse, or close companions is a futile endeavour, as it demands abilities and endowments that transcend one's capacity to possess or bestow.

The approach to grief should be informed by the same rationality employed in other forms of suffering. Through a process of rational re-framing, the (irrational) suffering can be addressed and ultimately resolved. As Seneca insightfully notes, "We may shed tears, but we must not lament."

This perspective is not exclusive to classical Western thought; it is also manifested in ancient Chinese thought. In this section, we will examine the manner in which the Daoist philosopher Zhuangzi reflected on the death of his wife.

Following the demise of the aforementioned individual, I found myself profoundly affected. However, I subsequently conducted a thorough examination of the matter from its inception. In the primordial state, she was non-existent, devoid of form and substance. It is evident that, in due course, her substance manifested, followed by her form, and subsequently her life. It is evident that a subsequent alteration has occurred, resulting in the demise of the subject. The process under scrutiny may be likened to the sequence of the four seasons: spring, summer, autumn, and winter. While she is thus situated within the vast expanse of the universe, for me to engage in lamentation would be to declare my ignorance of the immutable laws of nature. Consequently, I ceased to participate.

The predominant notion within such traditions is that grief is a personal deficiency to be surmounted. It is only upon the correction of our ignorance regarding the workings of the universe, and upon the clear perception of our circumstances, that grief will relinquish its dominion.

Cholbi (2023) challenges this perspective, proposing an alternative theoretical framework that explores grief as a multifaceted emotional experience. Grief is not a sickness to be cured; it is a universal and deeply human process that plays a distinctive role in a life well lived.

However, the question must be posed: how can an emotion so painful and debilitating as grief be considered valuable? In order to provide a satisfactory answer to the aforementioned question, it is first necessary to comprehend the true nature of grief. Upon completion of this process, the underlying reasons for our tendency towards grief will be revealed, and it will become evident that this tendency should not be a source of regret, but rather a welcome occurrence.

The fundamental question that needs to be addressed is the definition of grief itself and the object of that grief.

Cholbi's analysis commences with a delineation of the concepts of grief and mourning. Mourning can be defined as a complex set of behaviours and rituals that publicly honour the dead. However, it should be noted that mourning is not necessarily bound to grief. Participation in a minute's silence, general sadness, feeling pity for the deceased or their loved ones at a funeral are all possible without strictly grieving for those who have passed.

Cholbi's argument is that grief is characterised by self-concern. Although the outward manifestation of grief is a public affair, the experience of grief itself is inherently private and internal.

A paradigmatic case of grief may be defined as the emotional response experienced when an individual who is considered to be close to the bereaved party dies. This phenomenon can be conceptualised in terms of love, intimacy, or contribution to wellbeing. It has been demonstrated that the intensity of grief following the loss of a loved one, the depth of intimacy experienced, or the extent to which a person contributes to one's wellbeing, are positively correlated.

However, Cholbi contests the validity of these frameworks, contending that constructs of love, intimacy, and wellbeing do not fully capture the complexity of grief. Indeed, individuals experience a range of emotions in response to bereavement, including grief for partners, family members, and friends. However, it is also important to recognise the grief that accompanies the loss of role models and sporting heroes. The subjects of this study experience a range of emotions in response to the loss of relationships with estranged parents, rivals, and individuals with whom communication has been absent for an extended period.

Cholbi thus posits that a more efficacious conceptualisation in this context would be to grieve for those to whom our practical identities have been ascribed.

The practical identities of individuals are constituted by their conceptions of the past and future, as well as their values, commitments, and concerns. These elements are inextricably intertwined with the experiences and perspectives of other people. As Cholbi asserts:

The grief experienced in response to the death of an individual is appropriate to the extent that our practical identities are intertwined with their existence. The degree to which an individual is integral to our practical identity is directly proportional to the profound sense of loss we experience upon their demise.

This phenomenon elucidates the capacity to experience grief for individuals with whom we have no personal connection, yet whose lives hold significance in the context of our own self-concept. The loss of these individuals compels us to engage with our past and our future self in a profound way.

Furthermore, it elucidates the underlying mechanisms through which individuals experience grief in response to significant life changes, such as the dissolution of a romantic relationship, the onset of estrangement from close individuals, or the loss of employment. The emotional response of grief is precipitated by a substantial disruption to our pragmatic identities, thereby elucidating its variability.

Grief is not merely a transient sentiment of profound desolation; rather, it is a multifaceted process encompassing a myriad of emotions, including bewilderment, confusion, anguish, guilt, anger, regret, fear, alienation, boredom, nostalgia, joy, numbness, and numerous others.

The psychiatrist Elisabeth Kübler-Ross's renowned five-stage theory of grief (denial, anger, bargaining, depression, and acceptance) is accurate in its general approach, Cholbi suggests, though erroneous in substance. It is important to note that not all individuals experience the grief process in the same manner, nor do they necessarily go through the same phases or in the same sequence. However, Kübler-Ross's assertion that grief is an active process is indeed valid.

The subsequent discussion will therefore examine the process involved. If the experience of grief varies significantly between individuals, what characteristics might it share that enable its identification?

Grief is the process by which we attend to a rip in our autobiographies

The paradigmatic example of grief is the death of a close relative or friend. Cholbi's theory posits that bereavement is characterised by an ongoing and introspective examination of our relationship with the deceased, rather than a simple acknowledgement of the loss.

This transformation, or relationship crisis, subsequently triggers an identity crisis. The relationship must evolve; it is no longer tenable to continue in the same manner. Cholbi observes that there is now an unprecedented imbalance, which manifests itself in a number of disconcerting ways:

Conversations, rituals and activities involving the deceased are no longer observed. It is evident that certain conflicts between the bereaved and the deceased may no longer be brought to light or adjudicated in a satisfactory manner. It has been demonstrated that other conflicts have the effect of bringing them to the fore, insofar as they are revealed to exist in the open. It is no longer considered appropriate to entertain expectations regarding the potential actions or future development of the deceased. It has been demonstrated that the bereaved are capable of forgiving the deceased; conversely, the deceased are not capable of being forgiven by the bereaved. It is no longer feasible to plan with or around the deceased as was previously possible.

This phenomenon underscores the profound nature of grief, which often leaves us grappling with a sense of disorientation. Our world, once shaped by the presence of the deceased, now seems to have been irrevocably altered. In the absence of these elements, our fundamental stance towards the world, our basic understanding of our capabilities and our identity, no longer aligns with the actual possibilities available to us.

The loss of an individual with whom our identities are closely associated has been demonstrated to result in a disruption to our personal, first-person, autobiographical conception of reality. The process of grief can be defined as the psychological response to the experience of loss, characterised by a range of emotional and psychological symptoms. These symptoms include a sense of loss, a feeling of grief, and a tendency to reflect on the past and future in relation to the loss. It is imperative to address the raw reality of what has been lost, whilst concurrently confronting the remainder of life in the absence of the deceased.

The oscillation between these retrospective and prospective processes engenders a plethora of emotions, and this variance in our emotions is connected to the variance of our prior relationship to the deceased, as Cholbi suggests. The present situation is being examined with a view to establishing what the relationship was, what was hoped for for its future, and what it can now be.

This is why the process of grief, while universal in nature, manifests differently in each individual. Cholbi draws parallels with musical improvisation, suggesting that although individuals may be provided with a predetermined score and key, the execution of the piece varies significantly between performers. As Cholbi asserts:

Grief is a process in which individuals engage with an emotional sequence that is not entirely of their own choosing. However, they are able to imbue this sequence with significance that transcends the emotions that serve as the affective ingredients of grief episodes. It is evident that, despite the absence of active orchestration of grief, a wholly passive and spectator-like relationship to it is not observed either. The notion of grief as a process that is actively engaged in by the individual, as opposed to being a passive experience, is a fundamental tenet of this perspective.

The phenomenon of grief can be characterised as unexpected due to its ability to underscore severed connections that had previously been overlooked. In the context of day-to-day living, it is important to recognise the profound influence that our commitments, concerns, values, and conceptions of the past and future are inextricably intertwined with our relationships with other individuals.

The abrupt transformation of these relationships invariably provokes a state of shock, thereby underscoring the vulnerability and mutability of our practical identities. The consequence of this is that we become unanchored and drift. Attempting to comprehend the absence of our former selves, we are compelled to confront the potentiality of our current identity.

The fundamental question that this study seeks to address is the provenance of the value attributed to grief.

It is therefore perplexing that Cholbi would consider the potential value of grief, given its inherently destabilising and painful nature. The response provided is that, in the context of loss, grief serves as the process through which individuals can undergo a transformation in their sense of self.

The experience of grief has been shown to serve as a catalyst for introspection, prompting individuals to attend to their values, commitments, and concerns. Cholbi asserts that the work's "brutal intensity" has the capacity to facilitate a form of self-knowledge that is rarely achieved through other experiences.

This sense of no longer fully knowing who one is, of having lost one's way in a previously familiar emotional environment, alludes to the purpose and the good of grief. If grief represents a kind of ignorance of self – a condition of no longer recognizing oneself as oneself – then we can expect that grief's successful resolution will involve a reconstruction of one's knowledge of self. The contention herein is that the positive aspect of grief is self-knowledge.

The fundamental purpose of grief, therefore, is not to eliminate the emotions experienced towards the deceased; rather, it is to construct a new practical identity through the process of loss.

Attending to and working through grief, while excruciating, ultimately decelerates the spiral of the dizzy, fractured self. The resolution of a grief episode is achieved through the successful incorporation of the loss into one's autobiography.

This does not imply that the emotional responses associated with grief will invariably cease. The phenomenon of waves of grief can be defined as a recurrent emotional response characterised by a period of intense, prolonged bereavement. The wound is still present, and there is a possibility that it will persist indefinitely. The objective of grief is not to move on or let go, but rather to incorporate and reformulate. The process of grief is not merely a matter of moving on; rather, it becomes an integral part of one's identity.

It is argued that the human tendency towards grief should be considered a strength rather than a weakness.

Cholbi's argument is that, while the death of loved ones should not be wished for, when they occur, the process of grief should not be a source of regret. Despite the tendency to lament an untimely death, our proclivity for grief ought to be embraced, as it signifies a salutary response to the metamorphosis of a relationship that holds significance for our practical identities. If we were to consider the notion of being better off without the experience of grief, it would be necessary to first define what it means to grieve.

In contrast to the classical thinkers with whom the discussion began, who suggested that grief is largely irrational, Cholbi proposes that grief is rational provided it is proportionate to the extent to which the deceased played a role in our practical identity.

It is evident that not all instances of grief will result in the individual experiencing a process of self-knowledge. In some cases, the experience of grief can have a detrimental effect on an individual's well-being. Cholbi's argument does not posit that grief will inevitably result in a positive resolution; rather, it contends that grief does not inherently stem from a deficiency in principle. In other words, it is not synonymous with a state of indisposition or a pathological condition. Instead, it should be conceptualised as a universal human experience with the potential to facilitate the reformation of our practical identities in a manner that respects and honours our relationships with those who hold significance in our lives. As Cholbi asserts:

The attainment of self-knowledge, as facilitated by grief, has been shown to result in an enhancement of autobiographical coherence and integrity in individuals. From the vantage point of the present, the entirety of our lives appears to be imbued with greater meaning. The deaths of those in whom we had our practical identities invested have been incorporated into our current practical identities, and to the extent that our current practical identities survive into the future, they are invested in our future lives as well. The process of grief, when it reaches its zenith and gives way to self-knowledge, serves as a catalyst for the avoidance of alienation and the fragmentation of our sense of self.

In Grief: A Philosophical Guide, Cholbi's objective is to demystify the role grief plays in every human life. The emotional response to bereavement is often characterised by a crisis in the relationship with the deceased, which in turn can precipitate an identity crisis within the individual. The experience of grief compels individuals to confront and address this crisis, thereby prompting introspection and the realisation of what is truly significant for their practical identities. This process, characterised by profound personal distress, facilitates a deeper understanding of oneself and the reconstruction of one's self-identity.

The value of grief, therefore, is that it fosters self-knowledge, which is vital to our attempt to live well in an unavoidably impermanent world. In this context, Nietzsche's perspective on suffering is particularly relevant: He goes on to observe that, while he harbours doubts as to whether such pain can be considered a positive force, he is convinced of its profound nature.

Cholbi (n.d.) posits that, despite the excruciating nature of the process, it is imperative for individuals to engage in a period of profound bereavement in order to facilitate a comprehensive self-understanding. This process, rife with emotional distress, serves as a catalyst for introspection and self-discovery.

The rich self-knowledge that grief bestows upon us, encapsulating the values, commitments and concerns that constitute our practical identities, would be rendered significantly less valuable if it were readily attainable. However, due to an individual's inability to be fully transparent with themselves, the process of grief is essential in facilitating a deeper level of self-knowledge. It is crucial to emphasise that grief cannot be evaded. While it is possible to grieve in a more rational manner, it is important to recognise that the complex emotional processes involved in grief cannot be oversimplified. It is not our objective to do so.

Living A Good Life

Iris Murdoch posited that "unselfing" is of crucial importance in order to live a good life.

Iris Murdoch theorised that the inner lives of individuals are frequently impeded by what she termed the "fat, relentless ego". It is posited that by reflecting upon the aesthetic qualities present in both natural and artistic phenomena, there exists the possibility of diminishing the influence of the ego (a process Murdoch refers to as "unselfing"). This, in turn, can facilitate a heightened awareness of reality.

Iris Murdoch (1919-1999) was an Irish-British philosopher and writer who is best known for her moral philosophy and philosophical novels.

Murdoch is regarded as a formidable and original thinker, and in her philosophical work she developed and defended a unique ethical system. Meanwhile, her contributions to literature include 26 award-winning novels, some of which are celebrated as among the most interesting literary works of the 20th century in the English language. The following texts have been the source of particular enjoyment thus far: The Bell, The Black Prince, and The Sea, The Sea. The former two are characterised by their depth and madness.

One of Murdoch's major ideas in moral philosophy is her concept of "unselfing".

Murdoch theorised that human beings frequently experience an inner life that is dominated by the "fat, relentless ego". However, she proposed that by engaging in contemplation of beauty in nature and art, it is possible to deflate the brooding, grasping self and to open one's eyes to reality.

In her 1970 philosophical work The Sovereignty of Good, Murdoch eloquently describes the process of "unselfing" in action:

The term 'beauty' is a convenient and traditional designation of a phenomenon that is both shared by art and nature and that provides a fairly clear sense of the idea of quality of experience and change of consciousness. The subject is observing the exterior environment whilst experiencing a state of anxiety and resentment, and is unaware of their surroundings. It is possible that the subject is contemplating the damage that has been done to their prestige. Subsequently, I observed a Kestrel in a stationary flight. In an instant, a transformation occurs. The introspective and self-aware individual, characterised by its sensitivity and self-consciousness, has now become a thing of the past. The only bird currently present is the kestrel. Upon further consideration, the significance of the other matter appears to diminish. It is evident that this is an act which can be deliberately executed: the allocation of attention to nature with the objective of purging the mind of self-centred concerns.

The concept of unselfing entails a shift in focus from the self to the world around us, as articulated by Murdoch in her 1964 essay The Idea of Perfection, where she describes it as a "just and loving gaze directed upon an individual reality."

While the concept of attentiveness might appear straightforward, its practical implementation is a complex process.

Murdoch (2023) offers a compelling perspective on the nuances of self-forgiveness, cautioning against a simplistic approach that involves forcefully imposing calmness and serenity upon a situation. Instead, Murdoch proposes a more nuanced and introspective method, emphasising the importance of self-forgiveness as a process of releasing attachments and allowing oneself to be present in the moment. She writes:

The notion of a self-directed engagement with nature appears to be a contrived concept. It is more natural and appropriate to experience pleasure in the existence of animals, birds, stones and trees in a state of independence and without a purpose.

It is posited that by divesting ourselves of our egoistic concerns, we are better positioned to observe reality with greater clarity and to create space for authentic connection. Murdoch's notion is articulated in a passage from one of her early essays, entitled 'The Sublime and the Good' (subsequently included in the collection entitled 'Existentialists and Mystics'). Writings on Philosophy and Literature):

Love can be defined as the profound realisation that another entity exists independently of oneself. The concept of love, as well as that of art and morals, can be considered the discovery of reality.

Murdoch's concept of 'unselfing' may be compared to the Buddhist notion of anātman, or no-self. By reducing the influence of the ego, which is often the cause of delusion, we can foster an environment conducive to compassion.

The 20th-century German writer Herman Hesse, in the collection Butterflies: Reflections, Tales, and Verse, also conveys a profound resonance with this notion.

In reflecting on Goethe's exclamation, "I am here, that I may wonder!", Hesse describes how truly contemplating nature — truly attending to and feeling wonder for nature — can help to dissolve the separations that are artificially imposed on the world.

In moments of awe, Hesse writes in a substantial yet beautiful passage that we experience the unity of all that exists:

The journey of wonder marks the commencement of this endeavour, and while it may ultimately culminate in a state of disillusionment, this should not be perceived as a futile pursuit. The act of observing and appreciating natural phenomena, such as moss, crystals, flowers, or beetles, the expanse of a cloud-covered sky, or the serene, vast movement of waves, or the intricate patterns of a butterfly wing, offers a momentary reprieve from the mundane demands of daily life. The intricate patterns and ornamentations of these natural phenomena, along with the vibrant transitions and shadings of their colours, serve as a source of wonder and inspiration. When confronted with the beauty of nature, whether through sight or other senses, individuals often find themselves enchanted and momentarily absorbed in its grandeur. This experience enables them to escape the confines of human need, which is often characterised by avarice and blindness. Instead of engaging in thought or action, as in the pursuit of acquisition, exploitation, conflict, or organisation, they are able to engage in a state of pure wonder. This wonder not only fosters a sense of connection with fellow humans, but also with poets and sages throughout history, such as Goethe.Furthermore, it engenders a sense of fraternity towards the awe-inspiring phenomena observed and experienced in the living world, such as butterflies and moths, beetles, clouds, rivers and mountains. This phenomenon occurs when one ventures into the realm of wonder, momentarily escaping the realm of separation and entering that of unity.

The process of unselfing is a method of achieving a connection with the concept of good.

Murdoch's observations on the concept of beauty in both art and nature suggest that it serves as a catalyst for unselfing, or the process of transcending the ego. This phenomenon is said to induce a shift in consciousness, leading to a reduction in self-centered concerns. Murdoch's discussion of the transformative capacity of art can be found in The Sovereignty of Good:

The conception and appreciation of great art are activities that stand in absolute opposition to the pursuit of selfish obsession. It has been argued that this process invigorates the best faculties of the human soul, inspiring love in the highest part of the soul, as described by Plato. This ability is partly attributable to a quality it shares with nature: a perfection of form that encourages non-possessive contemplation and resists being absorbed into the self-centred dream life of the consciousness.

Murdoch's concept of "unpossessive contemplation" facilitates a reconnection with reality as it is, in its actuality. This process entails a moral dimension.

In response to Nietzsche's declaration of the death of God, existentialist philosophers of the 20th century argued that individuals are responsible for creating their own meaning and values. However, Murdoch proposed an alternative approach.

Murdoch asserts that the rejection of God does not necessitate the rejection of all structures of objective value. Indeed, the prevailing conception of God can be supplanted by a Platonic-like notion of "the Good". Notwithstanding the assertions put forth by existentialists, there is an objective moral reality that exists independently of the self, which can be apprehended by human beings and serves as a motivating factor for moral conduct.

Murdoch (2019) posits that this moral reality is evidenced in cases of clear moral virtue, such as acts of courage, honesty, and kindness. It is from such simple acts that we are able to ascend in our analysis, reflecting on the Good they express.

It is important to note that the concept of the Good is not portrayed as transcendent in Murdoch's depiction. This phenomenon cannot be attributed to some enigmatic, extra-terrestrial force that lies beyond the scope of our quotidian experience.

Instead, the ability to engage with others is predicated on the ability to suspend one's ego, to "unself", and to attend conscientiously and compassionately to the individual realities of others.

Murdoch's concept of "transcendent" in the context of moral philosophy entails the self-abnegation necessary to perceive reality as it truly is. She writes:

The concept of the self, as well as the place where we reside, is one that is characterised by the presence of illusion. The concept of goodness is intrinsically linked to the endeavour to perceive the self as an entity separate from the world, and to respond to the external environment in accordance with a virtuous consciousness. This is the non-metaphysical meaning of the concept of transcendence to which philosophers have repeatedly resorted in their explanations of goodness. The assertion that "good is a transcendent reality" signifies that virtue constitutes an endeavour to penetrate the veil of selfish consciousness and engage with the world in its authentic state.

While the aspiration to "pierce the veil of selfish consciousness" is indeed laudable, the task is by no means an easy one. As Murdoch concludes the passage:

It is an empirical fact about human nature that this attempt cannot be entirely successful.

Murdoch's conception of the good life is thus one that attempts to transcend its egoistic concerns. Consequently, the cultivation of genuine attentiveness, meticulous observation, and the creation of art can be regarded as ethical accomplishments.

The practice of unselfing facilitates a connection with the Good. Through our patient efforts to see reality and other persons clearly, by paying what Murdoch calls attention, we express virtue — and, ultimately, our capacity for love.

Refuting Hedonism

Nozick's Experience Machine: The question of whether or not it refutes hedonism is posed.

Robert Nozick's experience machine is frequently cited as a compelling argument for the existence of more to life than mere pleasure. The present article delineates the thought experiment, and proceeds to discuss the reasons why hedonists consider it to be deeply flawed.

The question of what it means to live a good life is one that has been asked many times throughout history and is still asked today. The fundamental question that this study seeks to address is the following: what factors contribute to the intrinsic value of a life? If we were to describe an individual as 'happy', what qualities would their life be characterised by?

In order to provide a response to such inquiries, a prevalent philosophical standpoint among scholars is that of hedonism.

This is not to be confused with the kind of hedonism that is characterised by the pursuit of endless carnal pleasures; rather, it is prudential hedonism, the philosophical position that posits that, ultimately, when it comes to personal wellbeing, pleasure is the only intrinsic good and pain the only bad.

While there are different types of hedonism, hedonists generally assert that, when considered in essence, all that is recognised as 'good' – such as friendship, love, kindness, growth, solving problems and high achievement – is underpinned by the pursuit of pleasure. It is evident that all that is recognised as 'bad' – such as loneliness, vice, fear, shame and failure – is underpinned by a feeling of discomfort or distress.

It is often posited that the pursuit of a satisfactory life may appear to be a complex undertaking. However, hedonists have been known to challenge this perception by asserting that, in fact, the essence of a good life is the pursuit of personal contentment. The term "happiness" can be defined as the preponderance of pleasure over pain.

Consequently, the fundamental approach to achieving a satisfactory existence should be predicated on the following insight: the optimal life is characterised by an experience of greater pleasure than that of pain.

The 'pleasure principle' is a concept that has exerted a significant influence on philosophical thought. This concept is exemplified by the philosophy of the ancient Greek thinker Epicurus, who advocated a life guided by a hierarchy of pleasures, with long-term mental tranquility representing the pinnacle of achievement and short-term physical pleasures occupying the lowest echelon.

Furthermore, it constitutes the foundation of Jeremy Bentham's ethical theory of utilitarianism, which asserts that "the greatest happiness of the greatest number is the measure of right and wrong."

Whilst hedonism is a popular and influential philosophical theory, it is not without its critics.

It is important to consider whether there are aspects of a good life that extend beyond mere physical well-being.

The philosopher Robert Nozick is of the opinion that this is indeed the case, and in his 1974 book Anarchy, State, and Utopia he introduces a renowned thought experiment with the aim of disproving hedonism (along with other mental state theories of wellbeing).

The Experience Machine

In Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Nozick posits the following hypothesis: "Suppose there were an experience machine that would give you any experience that you desired."

Superduper neuropsychologists have the capacity to stimulate the brain in such a manner that the individual experiences themselves to be composing a compelling novel, establishing a meaningful connection with another person, or engaging with a thought-provoking book. The subject would be continuously immersed in a tank to which electrodes would be attached to the brain.

The question that needs to be addressed is:

The question must therefore be posed: should the individual subject themselves to the machine permanently in order to preprogramme their life's experiences?

What are your thoughts on the matter? Would you connect to the machine?

Nozick's position is that the majority of individuals would not (and indeed should not) engage in this practice.

It is evident that a substantial corpus of empirical studies lends credence to Nozick's intuitions. Weijers (2014), for instance, found that 84% of the participants asked about Nozick's machine were averse to plugging in.

However, if the notion of a good life is predicated solely on the pursuit of positive experiences, as is purported by hedonists and proponents of alternative theories of wellbeing, then it would seem counterintuitive to eschew the prospect of plugging into a machine that could guarantee such experiences.

The question that is posed here is that of the factors that prevent the act of plugging into the experience machine.

The obvious response to this question, and the one that Nozick suggests we should adopt, is that we do not wish to become complicit in the pursuit of pleasure, as there are other aspects of life that should be given consideration.

In summary, hedonism is considered to be a fallacy, as the notion of a "good life" encompasses more than mere physical pleasure. According to Nozick's observations, the pursuit of genuine action is a fundamental aspect of human existence. The objective is not merely to indulge in a series of arbitrary and hedonistic pursuits; rather, it is to embody a distinct and defined character. Nozick's (1998) work is a seminal text in this field.

The notion of an individual suspended in a tank, devoid of any discernible characteristics, prompts the question of whether they can be considered courageous, kind, intelligent, witty or loving. The issue is not simply one of difficulty in determining the truth of the matter; it is impossible to conclude that he is. The act of connecting to the machine is often considered to be a potentially fatal act.

According to Nozick, the notion of the good life encompasses more than merely acquiring particular experiences; it is characterised by a desire for contact with reality. The objective is to ensure that our lives are grounded in reality.

As Nozick summarises:

It is through the process of imagination, specifically the conceptualisation of an experience machine, that we become aware of the existence of experiences that hold significance beyond the realm of direct experience. However, upon further introspection, it becomes evident that the utilisation of this machine is not a practical consideration.

Nevertheless, while the experience machine is frequently regarded as a compelling argument against hedonism, some philosophers have noted that the thought experiment utilises a number of psychological biases.

While there may be reluctance to engage with the machine, this does not imply that non-engagement is the optimal approach, nor does it refute the notion of hedonism. Our perspective is obscured by preconceived notions.

It is asserted that once this bias is exposed, it becomes apparent that Nozick's thought experiment does not pose any threat to hedonism.

It is imperative to consider the following factors: technophobia and the status quo bias.

It is important to note that Nozick's thought experiment extends beyond the realm of mere pleasurable experiences; it encompasses the notion of relinquishing control to a formidable and enigmatic apparatus with which we are woefully unacquainted.

The rejection of the machine does not necessarily entail a rejection of pleasure; rather, it is indicative of a general sense of unease with technology.

This concern is associated with the concept of the status quo bias in philosophy, which refers to the human tendency to favour the maintenance of the status quo.

This bias is revealed when Nozick's thought experiment is reversed, as noted by the philosopher Lorenzo Buscicchi in a 2022 essay.

The following hypothesis is put forward: if a credible source were to inform you that you are currently experiencing a virtual reality programme, would you accept this as valid? The reality of the situation is something you are not privy to. In the event that an individual is presented with the option of eradicating their recollection of a particular dialogue in exchange for an immersive experience within the realm of reality, which option would be most favourable?

Empirical studies demonstrate that, in such circumstances, the majority of individuals would elect to remain within the experience machine. Buscicchi's observations on the matter are as follows:

A comparison of this result with people's responses to Nozick's experience machine thought experiment reveals the following: In Nozick's experience machine thought experiment, participants have a propensity to opt for a tangible and well-known life, as opposed to one characterised by heightened pleasure. Conversely, in the reversed experience machine thought experiment, individuals demonstrate a preference for a well-known life over a tangible one. It appears that familiarity exerts a greater influence than reality, thereby weakening the robustness of Nozick's original argument.

In accordance with the principles of status quo bias, the experience machine is not rejected on the basis of a preference for reality over pleasure. Rather, it is rejected due to a sense of disquiet associated with a radical departure from the familiar, which would entail the relinquishment of all existing commitments.

The hedonistic bias

Another method by which philosophers defend hedonism from Nozick's thought experiment is by asserting that, contrary to the claim, our aversion to plugging in is in fact motivated by hedonism.

Nozick hypothesises that humans possess an innate desire to remain anchored in the tangible world. However, the underlying motivations that fuel this desire remain a subject of inquiry. The question must therefore be posed: what is the motivation for our desire to maintain our connection to reality? It may be posited that the motivation for our attachment to the real world is the subjective expectation that it will engender a positive emotional state.

The so-called 'paradox of hedonism' is instructive in this regard: it is often the case that pleasure is best pursued indirectly.

It is rare for us to set out with the sole objective of achieving personal gratification; rather, we engage in activities such as walking, spending time with loved ones, reading a book, or working on a personally significant project. These activities, too, can be sources of personal satisfaction.

As Epicurus observes, pursuing every immediate, short-term pleasure is not a rational strategy for maximising overall pleasure. Consequently, individuals often forgo short-term pleasures — and even tolerate pain — in order to secure longer-term pleasures such as mental tranquility.

Nozick's experience machine exploits this discrepancy between short-term and long-term pleasures. It is perhaps suspected, albeit subconsciously, that it offers only instantaneous pleasures, and thus it is rejected because it is thought that by remaining attached to reality, a better chance of attaining longer-term peace of mind is had — failing to realise that this longer-term peace of mind is itself a form of pleasure.

The philosopher Matthew Silverstein elegantly articulates this perspective in his 2000 paper, In Defense of Happiness (note: he uses 'pleasure' and 'happiness' interchangeably):

It is evident that machine intuitions are reflective of human desire to maintain a connection with the external world and to monitor reality. Nevertheless, the aspiration to monitor reality is attributable to its function in engendering contentment. The intuitive views about what is prudentially good, which form the basis of the experience machine argument, are inextricably linked to the concept of happiness. Consequently, if we consider intuitions regarding the experience machine as contradictory to hedonism, our conclusions may be erroneous. Despite the fact that it diverts us from achieving happiness in the case of the experience machine, our aspiration to track reality indirectly points to happiness. The existence of intuitive sentiments in opposition to the experience machine should not result in the rejection of hedonism. Contrary to appearances, these intuitions point – albeit circuitously – to happiness. Consequently, the claim that happiness is the only thing of intrinsic prudential value appears to be valid.

According to this position, the experience machine is rejected on the grounds that life would be improved by living outside of it. Consequently, our response to the experience machine does not constitute a rejection of hedonism, but rather highlights our profound hedonic motivations.

The experience machine provides no indication of the veracity or falsity of hedonism.

In conclusion, certain philosophers posit that, irrespective of our decision to engage or not engage with the experience machine, our response to it is not informative of the truth or falsity of hedonism.

While the notion of engaging with the experience machine may not be a personally desirable option, this does not automatically imply the invalidation of hedonism as a valid philosophy. This is analogous to contending that (i) given our aversion to plugging in, we are not hedonists, and that (ii) since we are not hedonists, the concept of hedonism is erroneous.

As articulated by Harriet Baber in her 2008 paper, entitled 'The Experience Machine Deconstructed', this argument is expressed eloquently. She writes:

Irrespective of the subjects selected, the Experience Machine is incapable of either substantiating or refuting any philosophical theory of wellbeing. The objective of the present study is to test the empirical hypothesis that individuals who are informed and choose their options carefully prefer hedonically optimal states.

To summarise, the purpose of the experience machine thought experiment is to ascertain whether human beings would opt for a life of maximal pleasure or happiness.

Our suspicion of this kind of life does not imply an exclusive focus on pleasure or happiness as the sole intrinsic good; rather, it highlights our limited capacity to make optimal choices for ourselves.

The purpose of this discourse is to provide a robust defence of the experience machine.

In response to the concerns previously articulated, certain philosophers have proposed robust defences of Nozick's experience machine, proposing adjustments to the parameters of the thought experiment to accommodate specific biases and to mitigate its emphasis on individual preferences.

Eden Lin, for instance, in his 2016 paper How to Use the Experience Machine, suggests that we can refocus the thought experiment to accentuate hedonism as follows.

It is hypothesised that A and B possess equivalent lifespans and encounter analogous experiences. The sole distinction between the two subjects is that A inhabits a reality that is anchored in physical space and time, while B is connected to an apparatus that facilitates the acquisition of experiential data.

Which of these factors is more conducive to a higher quality of life?

If hedonism is true, then it follows that the quality of A and B's lives, and the value of their lives, is exactly the same.

However, Lin hypothesises that the majority of individuals would concur that, in terms of their personal wellbeing, A's life is superior to B's, on the grounds that A's life is a reality. In the event of being compelled to select a preference, the life of A would be favoured over that of B.

Whilst Lin's recent reinterpretation of the thought experiment offers protection against the status quo and hedonistic biases, a hedonist may raise concerns from a different perspective: namely, that the experiment exploits the so-called 'freebie problem'.

When presented with two options of equal value, but one of which incorporates an additional benefit, it is probable that the preference will be for the option that includes this additional benefit, despite the possibility that it may not be necessary or advantageous. The decision is made on the basis of probability, with the benefit being selected in the event that there is a possibility, however remote, that it may be advantageous.

In the context of Lin's thought experiment, the assertion that A has a superior life is not made on the basis of absolute conviction, but rather as a strategic hedge against the possibility that 'living in reality' possesses an intrinsic value that contributes to A's overall wellbeing. As Buscicchi asserts,

The majority of individuals will opt for the option that includes the complimentary bonus, not necessarily because they believe it possesses intrinsic value, but rather as a precautionary measure in case it does.