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How Knowledge Helps
The manner in which knowledge facilitates progress.
It is evident that knowledge has the capacity to facilitate a multitude of benefits in educational settings, extending beyond the mere refinement of cognitive abilities. The utilisation of this method has been demonstrated to facilitate the process of learning. It is evident that knowledge is not only cumulative; it also exhibits exponential growth. Those who possess a substantial foundation of factual knowledge tend to experience greater ease in acquiring additional knowledge, a phenomenon that can be conceptualised as the rich getting richer.
On this page:
The manner in which the acquisition of knowledge fosters further knowledge.
The manner in which knowledge enhances cognitive processes.
The assertion that "Knowledge is Good" is one that is frequently made. The following reading material is recommended for those wishing to acquaint themselves with the motto of the mythical Faber College, as featured in the 1978 film Animal House. Those engaged in the field of education would concur, despite any deficiencies in their ability to articulate this viewpoint with the same degree of eloquence. However, the fundamental question remains: what are the benefits of knowledge? In the course of my research, I have encountered numerous educators who have employed the metaphor "It's grist for the mill" to articulate this phenomenon. It is evident that the primary objective of education is no longer merely the accumulation of knowledge; rather, it is now regarded as a process of refining cognitive abilities, such as the capacity for critical thinking. The importance of knowledge in this context stems from the necessity of providing students with material to facilitate critical thinking.
While it is indeed the case that knowledge provides students with a subject to ponder, a perusal of the extant research literature from the field of cognitive science demonstrates that knowledge performs a multitude of functions, extending far beyond the mere refinement of cognitive abilities. The process in question has been demonstrated to facilitate the process of learning. It is evident that knowledge is not only cumulative; it also exhibits exponential growth. Those who possess a substantial foundation of factual knowledge tend to experience greater ease in acquiring additional knowledge, a phenomenon that can be conceptualised as the rich getting richer. Moreover, factual knowledge has been demonstrated to enhance cognitive processes such as problem solving and reasoning. The correlation between the richness of the knowledge base and the efficacy of cognitive processes is well-documented; indeed, these are the cognitive processes that teachers seek to cultivate. Consequently, the more knowledge students accumulate, the more intelligent they become. The study will commence with an examination of the manner in which knowledge fosters the acquisition of further knowledge. This will be followed by an analysis of how knowledge enhances the quality and the speed of thinking.
The manner in which the acquisition of knowledge fosters further knowledge.
The capacity to acquire new knowledge is directly proportional to one's existing knowledge. The process of acquiring new knowledge can be considered seamless, yet cognitive scientists have proposed a three-stage model to facilitate a more profound comprehension. It has been demonstrated that the assimilation of knowledge is beneficial at every stage of the learning process. This includes the initial phase of information absorption, whether through auditory or visual means, the subsequent cognitive processing of the information, and the final storage of the material in memory. The following discussion will proceed to address each of these stages in turn.
The manner in which knowledge facilitates the assimilation of new information.
The initial phase in which factual knowledge confers a cognitive advantage occurs during the assimilation of new information, whether through auditory or visual means. It is evident that there are numerous factors to be considered when attempting to comprehend oral or written language, and these extend beyond the mere knowledge of vocabulary and syntax. Comprehension is contingent on background knowledge, as language is replete with semantic breaks in which knowledge is assumed. Consequently, comprehension is dependent on the formation of accurate inferences. In casual conversation, the listener can gather missing background knowledge and assess their inferences by posing questions (e.g., Did you mean Bob Smith or Bob Jones?). The term 'entrepreneur' is frequently employed in both academic and popular discourse, yet its precise meaning is not always clear. When analysing a film or literary work, however, this ambiguity is not present. In certain instances, students may feel too embarrassed to ask questions during class.
In order to provide concrete examples and simplify the discussion, the focus will be on reading, although it should be noted that the same points apply to listening. It is to be posited herewith that the following brief text is to be perused by the reader. "John's countenance fell as he gazed downwards at his conspicuously distended abdomen. The invitation specified 'black tie', and he had not worn his tuxedo since his own wedding, 20 years earlier. It is reasonable to infer that John is concerned that his tuxedo will not fit, despite the text providing no direct indication of this potential issue. The writer could add specifics ("John had gained weight since he last wore his tuxedo, and worried that it would not fit"), but these are not necessary and the added words would make the text dull. The human mind is capable of filling in gaps in information due to its ability to form hypotheses and draw conclusions. This is evidenced by the fact that individuals often gain weight after their wedding, which results in their old attire becoming unfit. This background knowledge about the world is readily available and so the writer need not specify it.
It is evident that knowledge facilitates the acquisition of further knowledge, primarily through its ability to facilitate accurate inferences. Should the author presuppose that the reader possesses a degree of knowledge with which they themselves are not equipped, this will inevitably lead to a state of perplexity. To illustrate this point, consider the following example: if one were to encounter the phrase "He was a real Benedict Arnold about it" and were unaware of the historical figure Benedict Arnold, one would be at a loss to comprehend the reference. The implication of background knowledge is uncomplicated and readily comprehensible. Consequently, the capacity to comprehend a text is demonstrably associated with existing knowledge (Kosmoski, Gay, and Vockell, 1990). The ability to discern additional information is indicative of an advanced reading comprehension.
It is important to note that the majority of individuals are not consciously aware of the inferences they make when engaging with written material. For instance, upon reading the aforementioned text, it is improbable that the following thought occurred to the reader: "Hmmm ... let me see now ... why am I being informed about the last time he wore his tuxedo? It is therefore reasonable to hypothesise that this may have precipitated the emotional response observed in the subject." The employment of conscious inferences is redundant in this context, as the cognitive processes that interpret written language automatically access not only the literal words themselves, but also the ideas associated with those words. Consequently, when one encounters the word "tux," the cognitive processes responsible for comprehending the text can access not only the concept of "a formal suit of clothing," but also all the associated concepts stored in memory. Tuxedos are costly, seldom worn, and not comfortable. They can be rented, and are often worn at weddings. As the text illustrates, the cognitive processes that extract meaning also have access to concepts represented by the intersection of ideas; for example, the concept of "tux" makes available the concept of "clothing," and the concept of "20 years after wedding" makes available the concept of "gaining weight." The intersection of "clothing" and "gaining weight" yields the concept of "clothing that no longer fits", which is a key factor in John's discontent. These associations and inferences occur outside of awareness. It is only the result of this cognitive process — that John is concerned his tuxedo will no longer fit — that enters consciousness.
On occasion, this process of subconscious inference generation encounters failure, resulting in an inability to establish a connection between the ideas presented in the text. In such cases, processing is halted and an increased effort is made to establish connections between the words and ideas in the text. This increased effort necessitates conscious processing. For instance, if one were to read the following text later in the same document, one would encounter the phrase, "John walked down the steps with care. Jeanine regarded him intently as she awaited his response. At length, she remarked, "I am indeed gratified to have some fish in my handbag." It is submitted that Jeanine's comment has the potential to disrupt the customary progression of the reading process. The rationale behind the presence of fish in this context remains unclear. A search would be conducted for a relationship between the act of carrying fish to a formal event and the other elements of the situation, including formal wear, stairs, purses, and information received about Jeanine and John. In this search, the popular notion that wearing a tuxedo can make one look a little like a penguin may be retrieved. This is likely to lead to the association that penguins eat fish. Jeanine is employing a metaphorical comparison between John and a penguin, thereby engaging in a form of light-hearted teasing directed towards him. The rationale behind this approach is articulated, thus paving the way for the continuation of the reading process. It is evident that general knowledge confers a second, more subtle benefit. Individuals with a more extensive knowledge base possess more profound associations among the concepts in their memory. When these associations are robust, they become accessible to the reading process automatically. This suggests that individuals with a broad foundation of knowledge may seldom find themselves compelled to pause their reading in order to actively seek connections.
This phenomenon has been verified through experimental means, in which subjects are presented with texts on topics that are familiar to them or not. For instance, Johanna Kaakinen and her colleagues (2003) presented subjects with a text outlining the symptoms of four prevalent diseases (e.g. influenza) with which they were already familiar, and a text detailing the symptoms of four less common diseases (e.g. typhus) with which they were less familiar. For each text, subjects were provided with additional information regarding the diseases, which they were likely unaware of.
The researchers utilised advanced technology to discreetly ascertain the focal point of the subjects' eyes as they perused each text. Consequently, researchers were able to obtain a precise measurement of reading speed, and could discern when subjects returned to previously read material. The researchers found that when reading unfamiliar texts, subjects more often reread parts of sentences and they more often looked back to previous sentences. The reading speed of the participants in this study was found to be slower than when they were reading texts with which they were familiar. These measures indicate that processing is slower when reading about something unfamiliar to the reader.
It is evident that a comprehensive understanding of the subject matter enhances an individual's proficiency in reading in two distinct ways. Firstly, it signifies that there is a greater probability of the subject possessing the knowledge necessary to successfully make the required inferences to understand a text. For example, the subject will be aware that people tend to be heavier 20 years after their wedding, and thus John is concerned that his tuxedo will not fit. Secondly, the possession of extensive background knowledge facilitates the efficient reading process, as it reduces the necessity to reread a text in order to actively seek connections between different elements. For instance, the reader will swiftly discern that Jeanine's allusion to John as a penguin in her fish remark serves to liken him to the avian creature.
The manner in which knowledge facilitates the cognitive processing of novel information.
Comprehending a text is merely the initial stage of learning; the subsequent stage is to engage in reflection. This phenomenon, termed "working memory" by cognitive scientists, functions as a temporary storage and processing system for thoughts. The term 'working memory' is often employed metaphorically to emphasise its limited capacity; it has been demonstrated that an individual can only maintain a finite amount of information in their working memory. For instance, the following exercise is recommended: read through the following list once, then look away and see how many of the letters you can recall.
CN
NFB
ICB
SCI
ANC
AA
The list comprised 16 letters, of which most people can recall approximately seven. This is because there is not sufficient space in working memory to maintain more than that. The following experiment is to be conducted with the list provided.
CNN
FBI
CBS
CIA
NCAA
This approach is evidently more straightforward. A comparison of the two lists reveals that they contain identical letter sequences. The second list has been reorganised in a manner that encourages the treatment of C, N, and N as a single unit, rather than as three separate letters. The process of organising information into these constituent parts is referred to as 'chunking'. This augmentation in the available capacity of the working memory is accompanied by an increase in cognitive capacity. The working memory of a typical person is capable of retaining approximately seven letters or an equivalent number of multi-letter chunks or pieces of information. It is important to note, however, that the efficacy of chunking is contingent on the existence of background knowledge. In the absence of prior knowledge pertaining to the acronym of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the term 'FBI' could not be regarded as a singular entity.
The capacity for chunking, along with its dependence on background knowledge, has been examined in a series of studies. The findings of these studies demonstrate that this ability enhances an individual's capacity to briefly recall a list of items, akin to the increased ability to recall more letters in the second example. This phenomenon has been documented in a variety of fields, including chess (Chase and Simon, 1973), bridge (Engle and Bukstel, 1978), computer programming (McKeithen, Reitman, Rueter, and Hirtle, 1981), dance steps (Allard and Starkes, 1991), circuit design (Egan and Schwartz, 1979), cartography (Gilhooly, Wood, Kinnear, and Green, 1988), and music (Sloboda, 1976).
It is evident that individuals rarely wish to recall a list in a concise manner. The significance of the chunking process lies in its ability to allocate additional free space within the working memory, thereby enabling the allocation of this space to other tasks, such as the recognition of patterns in the material. For instance, in one study (Recht and Leslie, 1988), researchers tested junior high school students who were either proficient or novice readers (as measured by a standard reading test) and who were also knowledgeable or not about the game of baseball (as measured by a test created for the study by three semi-professional baseball players). The children then proceeded to read a passage of a level appropriate for an early fifth-grade reading comprehension level, which described a half inning of a baseball game. The passage under scrutiny was divided into five sections, and following each section, the student was tasked with the use of a replica baseball field and players to reenact and describe the text. The researchers found that baseball knowledge had a significant impact on performance: Poor readers with a high baseball knowledge level demonstrated superior comprehension in comparison to their proficient counterparts with a limited baseball knowledge.
The purpose of this study is to examine the factors that have led to this situation. Initially, students with a strong baseball knowledge base were able to interpret a series of actions and categorise them accordingly. To illustrate this point, consider a scenario in which the text describes a play in which the shortstop throws the ball to the second baseman, who then throws the ball to the first baseman, resulting in two runners being out. Students with a background in baseball would be able to comprehend this sequence of actions by recognizing it as a double play. However, students lacking this knowledge would need to recall the entire series of actions. Secondly, the presence of baseball knowledge in the students enabled them to allocate a portion of their working memory to utilising the replica in order to reenact the play, in addition to providing a coherent verbal explanation. It was evident that the students, who possessed limited baseball knowledge, lacked the capacity to process information efficiently. Consequently, they did not have sufficient available working memory to simultaneously retain the sequence of actions, maintain the correct order, perform the reenactment, and provide a description of it.
This study illustrates the importance of the working memory advantage that background knowledge confers (see also Morrow, Leirer and Altieri, 1992; Spilich, Vesonder, Chiesi, and Voss, 1979). In the majority of cases, when individuals are engaged in the processes of listening or reading, it is insufficient to comprehend each sentence in isolation. Rather, there is a necessity to understand a series of sentences or paragraphs, and to hold these in one's mind concurrently, so that they can be integrated or compared. The process is rendered more straightforward if the material can be segmented into manageable units, as this results in a reduction in the amount of space required in the working memory. However, the efficacy of chunking is contingent on prior knowledge.
The manner in which knowledge facilitates the retention of novel information.
The acquisition of knowledge is also of significant benefit when one reaches the final stage of the learning process, namely the retention of that knowledge. In essence, the process of consolidating new information in one's memory is rendered more straightforward when there is already a degree of familiarity with the subject matter (Arbuckle et al., 1990; Beier and Ackerman, 2005; Schneider, Korkel, and Weinert, 1989; Walker, 1988). A considerable number of studies in this domain have utilised subjects who possess either a high or low level of knowledge on a specific subject. These subjects are presented with new material and subsequently undergo a test on the material at a later point in time. As a consequence, it is inevitable that those subjects who possess prior knowledge will demonstrate a higher level of retention.
A notable study in this area was conducted by David Hambrick (2003), which examined real-world learning over an extended period, a practice that is uncommon in related studies. Initially, Hambrick administered a series of questions to college students in order to ascertain their level of basketball knowledge. The test was conducted during the midst of the college basketball season. Subsequently, a period of two and one-half months elapsed (at the conclusion of the season), at which juncture the subjects completed questionnaires pertaining to their exposure to basketball (for example, game attendance, watching television, and reading magazines or newspapers). In addition, they underwent tests designed to assess their knowledge of specific men's basketball events from the preceding two and one-half months. The results demonstrated that subjects who reported an interest in the game also reported greater exposure to basketball information, as would be expected. A more intriguing discovery emerged when it was observed that, for a given level of exposure, individuals with a more extensive foundation of basketball knowledge exhibited a propensity to acquire a greater amount of novel basketball knowledge. In other words, individuals with a strong background in basketball demonstrated a higher level of retention regarding basketball-related information when compared to those with comparable levels of exposure to the same information but with less prior knowledge in the field. As previously mentioned in the introduction, there is a tendency for those with greater resources to accumulate additional benefits.
The underlying factors contributing to this phenomenon require further investigation. A substantial network of associations fosters the strength of memory, with new material being more likely to be recalled if it is related to existing memory. The process of acquiring and retaining knowledge in relation to a novel subject is often challenging due to the absence of an existing network in the memory that can be utilised to link the new information with existing knowledge. However, the process of recalling novel information pertaining to a familiar topic is relatively straightforward, primarily due to the ease with which associations can be formed between one's existing network and the recently acquired knowledge.
It has been hypothesised by some researchers that prior knowledge is of such significance to memory that it can effectively counterbalance or supplant what is conventionally regarded as aptitude. A number of studies have administered the same memory task to children with high and low aptitudes, some of whom have prior knowledge of the subject matter and some of whom do not. The studies found that only prior knowledge is important (Britton, Stimson, Stennett, and Gülgöz, 1998; Recht and Leslie, 1988; Schneider, Korkle, and Weinert, 1989; Walker, 1988). However, this assertion is not universally accepted among researchers in the field. It is reported that, although prior knowledge invariably facilitates memory, it is unable to eradicate the inherent aptitude disparities among individuals. Assuming equal exposure to new knowledge (as in a classroom without extra support for slower students), it can be deduced that students with lower aptitude will still be at a disadvantage compared to those with higher aptitude (Hall and Edmondson, 1992; Hambrick and Engle, 2002; Hambrick and Oswald, 2005; Schneider, Bjorklund, and Maier-Brückner, 1996). Ultimately, the issue remains unresolved; however, from a practical standpoint, its significance in the context of schooling is minimal. The central, undisputed finding is of the utmost importance: It is evident that all students will benefit from enhanced background knowledge.
The manner in which knowledge enhances cognitive processes.
The enhancement of cognitive function through knowledge acquisition can be achieved through two distinct mechanisms. Firstly, it has been demonstrated that this technique assists in problem-solving by increasing the available capacity of working memory. Secondly, it facilitates the process of thought by acting as a ready supply of things that have already been conceptualised (e.g., if the user has memorised the multiplication table for 5 + 5 = 10, they will not need to draw two groups of five lines and count them). In order to facilitate comprehension, the ensuing discourse will concentrate predominantly on research that explores the benefits of knowledge for problem solving. This is the type of thinking that students must do in mathematics and science classes. However, it is important to acknowledge that knowledge also enhances the reasoning and critical thinking skills that students must develop in history, literature and other humanities subjects.
The manner in which knowledge facilitates problem-solving.
In the preceding section, the manner in which prior knowledge facilitates reading was examined. This approach facilitates the compartmentalisation of information, thereby liberating working memory resources to address the implications of a text more comprehensively. The same level of benefit is achieved in a situation where one is attempting to solve a problem. In the absence of adequate background knowledge, the comprehension of the problem can dominate the working memory, thereby limiting the capacity to contemplate solutions. The following sample problem, known as the Tower of Hanoi, will serve to illustrate the impact of this phenomenon. The image depicts three pegs, each accompanied by three rings of increasing size. The objective is to manoeuvre all the rings to the extremity of the array, to the rightmost peg. The following two regulations must be observed: It is not possible to move more than one ring at a time, nor to place a larger ring on top of a smaller ring. The objective is to ascertain whether the problem can be resolved.
Should sufficient diligence be applied, it is conceivable that a resolution to the problem may be found. The solution to this issue is as follows: The sequence is as follows: A3, B2, A2, C3, A1, B3, A3.
The following problem is to be considered:
In the inns of certain Himalayan villages, a refined tea ceremony is practised. The ceremony is hosted by a designated host, accompanied by no more than two guests. Upon arrival and subsequent seating of guests at the host's table, the host undertakes three services for said guests. The sequence of these actions, ascribed by the Himalayans to the nobility, is as follows: stoking the fire, fanning the flames, and pouring the tea. During the ceremony, any individual present is permitted to pose the following question to another: "Honoured Sir, may I perform this onerous task on your behalf?" However, it is important to note that an individual may request of another only the least noble of the tasks that the other is performing. Furthermore, if an individual is engaged in any activity, they are precluded from requesting an activity that is nobler than the least noble activity they are currently engaged in. It is customary for all tasks to be transferred from the host to the most senior guest by the conclusion of the tea ceremony. The question therefore arises as to how this can be accomplished.
It is reasonable to hypothesise that, in order to comprehend this problem, one would be required to read the problem several times, in order to gain an understanding of it. However, it should be noted that this problem is, in fact, identical to the Tower of Hanoi. Each guest may be considered a peg, and each task a ring. The objective of transfer and the regulations that govern it are consistent. The salient difference between the two versions is that this one demands a greater capacity from the working memory. The initial version does not necessitate the maintenance of the problem in working memory, as it is represented in the figure with such efficacy. The second version requires that the solver retain the order of the tasks, whereas in the first version, it is possible to efficiently chunk the order of ring size – smallest to largest.
The aforementioned problems provide a sense of the advantages of background knowledge for problem solving. The problem solver with background knowledge in a particular domain perceives problems in her domain in a similar manner to the Tower of Hanoi; everything is perceived as simple and straightforward. However, when operating in unfamiliar domains, the efficacy of this problem-solving approach is hindered by the absence of contextual knowledge, resulting in challenges that bear a striking resemblance to the complexities inherent in tea ceremony. Her cognitive abilities are overwhelmed by the intricacies of the rules and the objective of the game.
These illustrations offer a novel perspective on the "grist for the mill" metaphor, suggesting that the presence of facts alone is insufficient for the initiation of analytic cognitive processes. It is imperative that a comprehensive understanding of the relevant facts is possessed. It is imperative that students possess a sufficient degree of background knowledge to identify familiar patterns – that is, to chunk – in order to become proficient analytical thinkers. To illustrate this point, consider the predicament of an algebra student who has not yet mastered the distributive property. In the event of encountering a problem involving a(b + c), it is imperative to halt and substitute straightforward numerical values to ascertain the most appropriate approach: whether to write a(b) + c, a + b(c), or a(b) + a(c). The optimal outcome is that he will ultimately complete the problem, albeit requiring a greater investment of time compared to students who possess a strong understanding of the distributive property (and, consequently, have segmented it as a single step in problem-solving). The prevailing hypothesis is that the subject's working memory will be overwhelmed, which will either result in the problem not being completed or an incorrect solution being arrived at.
The manner in which knowledge facilitates the circumvention of cognitive processes.
It is important to note that memory encompasses not only factual information, but also solutions to problems, complex ideas that have been analysed, and conclusions that have been drawn. It is important to consider the algebra students once more. It is evident that a student who does not possess a firm grasp of the distributive property is required to engage in meticulous deliberation each time they encounter the expression (a + b) + c. Conversely, a student who has firmly established this understanding can effectively bypass this process. Indeed, the cognitive system would be considered deficient if this were not the case; it is a far more efficient use of time to recall an answer than to solve the problem again. The challenge, of course, is that one may not always perceive the same problem, and it is possible to overlook the fact that a new problem is analogous to one one has previously encountered. For instance, one might have successfully solved the Tower of Hanoi problem and, in the space of moments, not realised that the tea ceremony problem is analogous.
Fortunately, knowledge also facilitates this process: A substantial corpus of research demonstrates that individuals tend to become more proficient in the creation of analogies as they accumulate experience within a particular domain. Novices tend to concentrate on the surface features of a problem, while those with more knowledge focus on its underlying structure. For instance, in a seminal experiment, Michelene Chi and her colleagues (Chi, Feltovich, and Glaser, 1981) invited novices and experts in the field of physics to categorise physics problems. The novice categorisers employed surface features as the primary means of identification, distinguishing between problems such as springs and inclined planes through the analysis of these characteristics. However, the experts sorted the problems based on the physical law needed to solve it (e.g., the conservation of energy). It is not simply a case that experts have more knowledge than novices; rather, they are able to identify problems in a different manner. In the case of numerous issues, the specialist is able to rely on their recollection of previous resolutions, thus negating the necessity for rational thought.
Indeed, in certain domains, knowledge is of greater importance than reasoning or problem-solving abilities. For instance, the majority of the disparities among elite chess players appear to be in their knowledge of game positions, as opposed to their efficacy in identifying a favourable move. It appears that two distinct processes are involved in the selection of a move in the game of chess. Firstly, a recognition process is initiated whereby a player ascertains which parts of the board are contested, which pieces are in a strong or weak position, and so forth. The second process is one of reasoning. The player then considers the possible moves and their likely outcome. The recognition process is rapid, and it identifies which pieces the slower reasoning process should focus on. However, the reasoning process is protracted, as the player consciously considers each possible move. A recent study has indicated that the recognition process is responsible for the majority of the variations observed among the most accomplished players. Burns (2004) conducted a comparative analysis of the performance of elite players in both normal and blitz tournaments. In the context of blitz chess, each player is allotted a time span of five minutes to complete an entire game. This is in stark contrast to the time frame typically afforded to players in a standard tournament, where a minimum of two hours is typically allocated for gameplay. Despite the accelerated pace of play, which afforded minimal opportunity for deliberation, the relative ratings of the players remained largely unaltered. This finding suggests that the factors contributing to the observed variations in performance among players are not attributable to differences in their slow reasoning processes, but rather to differences in their rapid recognition processes. This finding is rather striking. Chess, widely regarded as the quintessential game of strategy and cognitive assessment, has been found to be predominantly a game of memory for individuals who possess a high degree of proficiency. Researchers have estimated that the best chess players have between 10,000 and 300,000 chess-piece chunks in memory (Gobet and Simon, 2000).
Burns's (2004) study of chess skill has notable parallels with research in the field of science education. A recent meta-analysis (Taconis, Ferguson-Hessler, & Broekkamp, 2001) evaluated the results of 40 experiments that studied ways to improve students' scientific problem-solving skills. The findings indicated that effective interventions were characterised by their intention to enhance students' existing knowledge base. It was evident that the most efficacious approach was to request that students integrate and relate different concepts, for example by drawing a concept map or by comparing different problems. Interventions designed to enhance the students' scientific problem-solving strategies demonstrated minimal or no impact, despite the objective of all the studies being to improve scientific problem solving.
Knowledge, Knowers, and Power
The following essay will explore the concept of 'power' in relation to knowledge and its holders, also known as 'knowers'.
ABSTRACT
The present article aims to make a contribution to recent theorising around the concept of powerful knowledge. The present study commences with a discussion of the contemporary utilisation of the term within both academia and the broader institutional milieu of schools. A detailed account of the concept's origins in social realism is then provided, followed by an exploration of various iterations of the concept in recent academic work. The latter half of the article aims to elaborate on the concept of 'power' in the context of powerful knowledge by addressing the critiques put forward by the philosopher John White. The present author employs the philosophical work on the concept of power by Peter Morriss to this end. It is concluded that Morriss' analysis of power can assist in elucidating the reasons why 'power' is most effectively conceptualised as a disposition to effect certain ends. It is suggested that this approach assists in addressing some of the concerns raised by White, and it provides a framework for future consideration of the concept of powerful knowledge.
Introduction
The pages of this journal have included a number of contributions exploring the concept of powerful knowledge. The purpose of this article is to provide an analysis of that concept by charting its origins, development, and various iterations since its initial formulation. In addition, an attempt is made to contribute to some of the more recent theorising, particularly in relation to power, using the work of philosopher Peter Morriss. This development extends the findings of recent research conducted by Young and Muller on the 'power' element of the concept.
In order to achieve this objective, the present study will firstly explore the origins of the concept by examining the intellectual traditions against which it was a reaction. The subsequent discussion will proceed to chart its initial formulation as a sociological concept, before exploring the ways in which it has evolved into its modern, somewhat fragmented, usage within various educational discourses. In the following section, a number of the most significant objections to the concept that have been advanced by the philosopher John White are to be outlined. In response, this paper draws on Peter Morriss' philosophical work on power, which has hitherto not been included in any of the discussions of the concept, to provide a philosophical justification for the 'power' of powerful knowledge. It is concluded that when the concept of 'power' is understood as an ability to effect certain ends, many of the concerns surrounding the concept can be allayed. Furthermore, a more complete realisation of what is powerful in disciplinary knowledge can be achieved.
The impetus for this article can be understood as an implicit response to Michael Young himself. In particular, the concept of 'power' must be incorporated alongside the 'knowledge' of powerful knowledge. Young and his collaborators are, he argues, clear on the socio-epistemological basis of the concept, namely, social realism. However, he acknowledges that they currently lack a comprehensive theory of power. In more recent times, significant progress has been made by Young and Muller in the development of such a theory (Muller & Young, Citation2019). This is of particular significance given that a significant proportion of the discourse surrounding the concept is contingent on divergent conceptions of power and the manner in which it ought to be comprehended in relation to educational knowledge. The development of a suitable account of power would facilitate a more robust investigation of the relationship between social justice and powerful knowledge, a link that is currently only implicit in existing conceptions.
Powerful knowledge: what’s in a name?
The concept of "powerful knowledge" as applied to the theorisation of the curriculum and the purpose of schools was initially attributed to Wheelahan. However, it is most closely associated with the work of Michael Young and Johann Muller. The notion that knowledge possesses inherent power can be traced back to Bernstein's seminal work on pedagogy and knowledge structures. The term is most commonly employed to denote the properties of disciplinary knowledge that distinguish it from the common-sense knowledge of the community or home. This knowledge has been developed by specialist communities that employ discernible methods of enquiry and maintain stable boundaries between them (Young & Muller, Citation2016). Access to this potent knowledge enables students to transcend their experience and 'envisage alternative and new possibilities' (Young & Muller, Citation2013, p. 245). The concept has been the subject of extensive discussion and debate, garnering a diverse range of supporters from academic and subject specialist backgrounds, particularly within the domains of History and Geography.
Concurrently, educational policy and teaching practice have been influenced by the so-called 'knowledge-turn' in educational discourse. This has resulted in a backlash from educationalists who are concerned about certain trends they have observed in teachers' practice. The 'knowledge-turn' can be understood as a response to the overemphasis on skills and the world of work that was championed by the New Labour government, for example. This pedagogical approach overlooks the pivotal function of knowledge, disciplines and subjects in cultivating profound and enduring comprehension of the world, a comprehension that cannot be reduced to mere 'skills'. However, this initially progressive argument for subject-based education has, for many, been co-opted by a strikingly conservative approach to pedagogy reminiscent of the Freirean 'banking model.' Consequently, it is argued that two levels of tension are present concerning the term 'powerful knowledge'. One debate is more internal to educational philosophy and sociology and concerns its usefulness as an academic concept. The other pertains to the divergent methodologies employed by educational policymakers and the broader teaching profession in implementing the concept.
Notwithstanding the frequent utilisation of the term across a range of disciplines and contexts, both Young and Muller have proposed that 'powerful knowledge' bears the characteristics of a catchphrase rather than a substantial socio-philosophical concept. The two words themselves are so loaded that we might wonder, as Young and Muller themselves do, whether they are 'too evocative, and open to too many diverse meanings.' Philosopher John White advances a related argument when he posits that the term is merely a synonym for the knowledge imparted in school subjects. It therefore employs the emotive force of the term 'powerful' in an unjustifiable manner.
If White's assertion is accurate, it would be advisable to dispense with the term and adopt an alternative that is more informative and conceptually meaningful as a driving force for the knowledge present in the school curriculum. White posits that specialised knowledge would be a more suitable fit. It is argued that this would be an erroneous course of action, and that the utilisation of powerful knowledge is indeed apposite in describing the sorts of cognitive gains students make when given epistemic access to disciplinary knowledge in schools. The term 'specialised knowledge' is inadequate in itself to demonstrate the link between powerful knowledge, human agency and capability, and the broader project of developing flourishing societies. In order to comprehend the significance of the concept, it is imperative to explore its origins and the intellectual and political currents that influenced its development, as it is, to a certain extent, a response to these influences.
The present study explores the phenomenon of the retreat from relativism, examining its origins and background in the context of powerful knowledge.
A fundamental starting point in any attempt to recapitulate the concept of powerful knowledge is to distinguish its social realist epistemological commitments from the social constructivism with which it sets itself in opposition. Social constructivists, as posited by Young & Muller, are committed to the position that 'how we think about the world, our experience, and any notion of "how the world is" are not differentiated'. The consequence of this commitment is that all claims to objective knowledge are challengeable and, perhaps more troublingly, all such claims are ultimately arbitrary. A range of intellectual variants of this understanding of knowledge exist, which are beyond the scope of this article to survey. However, they encompass a variety of theoretical frameworks, including culturalism, Romantic nationalism, Indigenous Knowledge movements, certain radical strands of standpoint theory, and philosophical cultural relativism. In the sociology of education, the constructivist argument posits that knowledge is constructed by cultures or groups and that there is, therefore, no meaningful distinction between 'social' knowledge and the disciplinary knowledge characteristic of the development of scientific knowledge.
Michael Young's seminal work, Knowledge and Control (1972), posited the notion that school subjects are 'no more than the socio-historical constructs of a particular time' (Young, 1971, p. 23). This standpoint was subsequently refined under the influence of writers such as Rob Moore. The concern was that utilising his earlier social constructivism as an intellectual foundation for educational knowledge would result in the imposition of a 'cultural arbitrary', whereby the caprices of the ruling elites are imposed on the oppressed masses. The only apparent solution to this issue, given that all knowledge is socially constructed within specific cultures, would be the establishment of a hitherto undefined 'working class', 'feminist' or 'postcolonial' epistemology. If knowledge claims are merely the epiphenomenal outcrop of social arrangements, and if these social arrangements encode the cultural predilections of the already powerful, then any knowledge claim can be challenged and reimagined under different and more equitable social relations. It is an inevitable consequence of the present argument that if social relations are subject to alteration, then concomitantly the nature of knowledge and truth may also be subject to change.
In response, social realists may commend the revolutionary zeal of such approaches, but may also be hesitant to reduce knowledge to its context of production. Constructivism is an intellectual approach to education, knowledge, and the curriculum. It imagines the disavowal of truth, objectivity, and knowledge as tools for emancipatory politics. It is hypothesised that this could be achieved through the adoption of a postmodern stance, whereby all assertions of truth are considered to be contingent on specific contexts and frameworks of enunciation. Conversely, it could align itself with diverse 'voice discourses' in which truth claims were exclusively evaluable in relation to the varied standpoints of the knowers (Moore, Citation2009; Young, Citation2008). This perspective was adopted by individuals seeking to identify with marginalised groups. Following a broadly constructivist line of thinking, it was posited that the positionality of the knower within the group gave rise to a unique form of knowledge. In order to align with the principles of a political struggle that is ethically sound, it is necessary to acknowledge the knowledge claims of marginalised groups rather than making assumptions about objective truth. Social realists have been known to repudiate this, preferring instead to adopt a critical realist ontology. This ontology has been demonstrated to underpin both the objective and social basis of certain forms of knowledge.
The preceding account of the intellectual trajectory of knowledge and the curriculum may be developed by acknowledging that a significant proportion of the relativistic impulse in educational thinking was, in fact, a reaction to, and conscious departure from, behaviourism and positivism in the social sciences. Consequently, notions of 'objective knowledge' became intertwined with imperialistic authoritarianism, a concept that is antithetical to social justice. This perspective is encapsulated in the 'New Sociology of Education', a concept pioneered in the 1970s by Young and subsequent scholars. This theoretical framework sought to challenge the prevailing notion that school curricula offered neutral, objective knowledge. The central argument of this study is that, within the sociological framework of education, knowledge has been conceptualised in two distinct ways. Firstly, it has been viewed as a mechanism for political control by ruling elites. Secondly, it has been regarded as a means for political revolution by the oppressed. The social realist project aims to rehabilitate an understanding of educational knowledge that goes beyond the vested interests (be they left or right, revolutionary or conservative) of those who claim it (Young & Muller, Citation2013). The retreat from social constructivism in the sociology of education is therefore an attempted remedy to the evacuation of disciplinary expertise and specialised knowledge from thinking about the curriculum.
This paper sets out to explore the concept of social realism in the context of constructivism, with particular reference to the works of Durkheim, Bernstein and Vygotsky.
In the field of sociology of education, what alternative theoretical frameworks might scholars propose as a solution to the aforementioned issues? It is widely acknowledged that Émile Durkheim and Basil Bernstein have exerted a profound influence on the social realist approach to knowledge. The distinction between the 'sacred' and the 'profane' that Durkheim proposed has provided one enduring pair of concepts (Durkheim et al., Citation2008). At its most fundamental level, the distinction pertains to the separation of the practices of early religions – specifically totemic ones – from the everyday experience of the tribe or group. However, rather than perceiving religion as a domain of mere superstition or codified custom, Durkheim discerned the preconditions for the distinction between specialised knowledge and the knowledge of practical experience and day-to-day life. The distinction between the sacred and the profane is a prerequisite for the acquisition of intellectual and scientific knowledge, which is dependent upon abstraction and generalisation.
In particular, Young synthesises the Durkheimian concept of differentiation and specialisation with Vygotsky's theory of the distinction between everyday and scientific (or academic) concepts. This finding serves to build upon Bernstein's prior established connection between the two. Vygotsky's contributions are significant insofar as he also recognised a clear differentiation between everyday knowledge and the kinds of knowledge schools ought to be in the business of inculcating within students. He conceptualised access to theoretical concepts associated with different disciplines as the overarching goal, and the complex pedagogical relationships necessary to achieve this as the responsibility of teachers and educationalists more generally.
Durkheim's seminal work in the field of sociology provided a social account of objective knowledge, while Bernstein's seminal work sought to conceptualise the internal relations that explained how knowledge domains are structured (Bernstein, Citation2000). This paradigm shift gave rise to the distinction between vertical and horizontal discourse. The latter, in a manner similar to Durkheim, is associated with a profoundly contextualised understanding of the community, experience, and the quotidian. In the context of the vertical discourse, Bernstein identifies a second distinction between hierarchical and horizontal knowledge structures. The former relate to disciplines such as the natural sciences, in which knowledge accumulates progressively. The process of progression is marked by the gradual replacement of older knowledge with newer theories and observations that are deemed to offer a superior explanatory power. A horizontal knowledge structure is characterised not by 'subsumption' but by the 'addition of parallel theories, languages, or sets of concepts.' This description is more typical of the humanities and social sciences.
The social realist approach to understanding knowledge has been demonstrated to result in a bifurcation between knowledge and experience. The kind of knowledge that the curriculum should valorise reaches beyond the 'profane' of the everyday and allows for abstraction from our own context to a more abstract kind of symbolic representation. It is evident that a more precise delineation can be made by distinguishing between two distinct types of knowledge, as proposed by Bernstein: horizontal and vertical. Similarly, in Durkheim's theoretical framework, a distinction can be drawn between sacred and profane domains. Having delineated the motivating factors underpinning certain strands of social realist thinking, the subsequent discussion will proceed to posit a positive account of the characteristics of this hierarchical, disciplinary knowledge. This will be followed by an identification of the ways in which this knowledge can be conceptualised as powerful.
The transition from social realism to powerful knowledge is a significant shift in academic thought.
The concept of power has been defined in a number of ways, each of which has been subjected to rigorous scrutiny. The purpose of this study is to outline the various definitional projects that have been undertaken, prior to evaluating its most recent incarnation. This will enable the incorporation of philosophical work on power to assist in the consolidation of the concept.
As has been demonstrated, a social realist account of knowledge is a reaction against both positivism and constructivism. The positivist perspective is critiqued by the social realist project on the grounds that it is initiated from an asocial conception of knowledge, demonstrating a lack of consideration for the communities responsible for its production. This is illustrated by the assumption that knowledge is derived from a Platonic, pre-social, Archimedean point. An alternative version of knowledge, in many ways a reaction to the former, is over-socialised in that it reduces all knowledge claims to the 'voice' of the knower and their cultural or social group. Consequently, this undermines any endeavour to maintain objectivity and veracity. The result is a kind of relativism that renders knowledge as the arbitrary expression of knowers and groups of knowers rather than something that can transcend 'the traditions of its production.’
A social realist account acknowledges the social foundation of knowledge while concurrently recognizing that certain forms of knowledge are potent insofar as they facilitate abstract thought, thereby empowering individuals to conceptualize the unthinkable (Bernstein, Citation2000). As Young and Muller articulated, "A social realist theory perceives knowledge as comprising systems of methodically interconnected concepts and techniques for their empirical investigation, and the progressively specialised and historically situated groups of enquirers.” The initial formulation posited three characteristics of potent cognisance, proposing a cumulative nature wherein each element is contingent on the preceding ones. The three features are as follows:
The following discourse seeks to establish a clear distinction between the concepts of 'knowledge of the powerful' and 'powerful knowledge'.
The following discussion will attempt to establish a clear distinction between two forms of knowledge: non-specialised knowledge and specialised knowledge.
The following discussion will attempt to establish a clear distinction between two forms of knowledge: that which is specialised and powerful, and that which is specialised but less powerful.
A concise exposition of these concepts is imperative to comprehend the genesis of subsequent controversies that have emerged in relation to them. In light of the aforementioned definition of knowledge, Young and others have been keen to distinguish between the knowledge of the powerful and powerful knowledge. The former concept refers to the knowledge of elite, powerful social groups, whereas the latter refers to the disciplinary knowledge produced in epistemic communities, such as university departments, that offer our best attempts at finding truth about ourselves and the world (Young, Citation2008). For Young, knowledge is not merely a 'handmaiden to power'; it possesses its own inherent power (Young & Muller, Citation2013, p. 197).
This perspective stands in contrast to the prevailing sociological tradition, which has predominantly focused on the manner in which inequalities inherent in the societal background are amplified, reproduced, and exacerbated within educational settings. Consequently, there has been a prevalent perception that educational institutions adopt a conservative role within society, perpetuating the inequitable status quo. Social realism suggests that this is an irrefutable truth that requires redress. However, it is also imperative to acknowledge that powerful knowledge constitutes a component of a more etymologically conservative project, which merits our protection. The argument being put forward is that there is a form of conservatism that is inextricably linked to the concept of education. The conservation and transmission of knowledge as part of the division of cognitive labour is vital to ensure that the next generation does not need to rediscover knowledge ex nihilo. The connotations of 'transmission' are, unfortunately, Gradgrindian in nature, yet they do reveal an important truth.
Should the hypothesis that there is a meaningful distinction between knowledge of the powerful and powerful knowledge be accepted, it would be advisable for researchers to attend to two matters. Firstly, they should consider the nature of the knowledge that ought to be conserved. Secondly, they should consider the inequalities that schools can perpetuate. In their most recent articulation of the concept, Young and Muller have further argued that knowledge of the powerful is not really knowledge at all, or at least not in the sense they now understand it. Instead, it symbolises the manner in which certain groups utilise knowledge for the purpose of maintaining their dominance over others within an inequitable social structure. This kind of power, as posited by Young and Muller, treats knowledge as a 'rivalrous good', thereby engendering zero-sum competition between those devoid of knowledge and those endowed with it.
The second criterion mentioned above pertains to specialised knowledge, which is the result of insights from Durkheim, Vygotsky and Bernstein into the nature of knowledge, derived from specific disciplinary contexts. In their seminal work, Young and Muller proposed a novel framework for understanding Moore's criterion of specialised knowledge. They argued that the power of knowledge lies in its systematic revisability, emergence, realness, materiality/sociality. This can be considered a manifestation of hierarchical, vertical discourse as described by Bernstein. From this standpoint, the mastery of knowledge is conceptualised as a pyramidal structure comprising increasingly abstract concepts. Novices are expected to progressively assimilate these concepts as they aspire to attain proficiency within a designated domain. However, it soon became apparent that this would not suffice as an explanation of the arts. A significant proportion of the opposition to the work of Young and others stems from the extent to which powerful knowledge is inextricably linked to this conception of specialised knowledge. Nevertheless, recent studies have sought to ameliorate these tensions.
The transition from a state of potent cognition to one of cognitive potency.
The aforementioned understanding of powerful knowledge has been shown to be applicable in the context of mathematics and, arguably, select social sciences. However, it has been demonstrated to offer limited insight into the arts and humanities. Subsequent to this, Young and Muller have revised the concept of powerful knowledge, focusing specifically on the concept of power. The initial formulation exhibited a marked bias towards 'hierarchical knowledge structures' that prioritise empirical verification, conceptual integration and sequential progression. In the domain of English Literature, it remains ambiguous whether these characteristics serve to distinguish it as a conceptual field of enquiry. Conversely, Young and Muller's approach is to preserve the distinction between knowledge of the powerful and powerful knowledge, emphasising the significance of differentiation and specialisation. However, it has since been recognised that this focus was somewhat limited in scope, narrowly centred on the project of returning the concepts of truth and objectivity to the sociology of education. Consequently, the focus shifted to 'power as a "socio-epistemic property" of knowledge, as opposed to power as potential or capacity for social actors to act.'
In order to adequately address the disciplines in the arts and humanities, there is now a conception of certain forms of specialised knowledge as conferring power upon those who have access to it. This is in contradistinction to the conventional understanding of powerful knowledge as referring exclusively to properties inherent within the knowledge itself. In contrast, the present study posits that knowledge has the capacity to unlock latent abilities within students. One way in which this distinction is established is through the invocation of a distinction between potestas and potentia, a distinction that is derived from Spinoza (Lukes, 2005). The term 'potentia' is derived from the notion of 'power to', signifying the inherent capability and capacity to execute a given action. In contrast, 'potestas' is roughly translated as 'power over', a concept that underscores the notion of authority or influence over something or someone (Muller & Young, Citation2019, p. 202). The crux of the argument is the recognition that when the concept of 'power' is applied to the notion of 'powerful knowledge', it signifies an aptitude to perform actions that are valuable and worthwhile. It is therefore recommended that the kinds of knowledge advocated as the guiding curriculum principles for schools be regarded as a version of potentia, that is to say, the cultivation of abilities.
In their recent work, Young and Muller propose a novel conception of "powerful knowledge," which they define as referring to at least three distinct entities. Firstly, the term pertains to academic disciplines that 'produce specialised discourses that regulate and ensure reliability, revisability, and emergence' (Muller & Young, Citation2019, p. 209). Secondly, the correlation between academic influence and the school curriculum, which Muller and Young posit as providing 'signposts to the structure of the subject before adepts are empowered to generate new ideas'. Thirdly, power as a generative capacity in which students can 'make new connections, gain new insights, generate new ideas.' It is evident that the members of the Young and Muller cohort have now come to understand the development of a series of 'powers' that enable them to perform specific tasks. It is important to note that theorising around the concept is not an undertaking solely of scholars in the Anglophone world. A considerable body of recent research has sought to establish connections between knowledge and other educational traditions, such as didactics.
This notion extends beyond a mere catchy phrase. The philosophical underpinnings of potent cognition
The concept of powerful knowledge has been the subject of a range of criticisms. These include its inability to enact social justice, a suggestion it valorises a Western-centric notion of knowledge ill-attuned to the enduring legacy of colonialism, that the theory rests on unsustainable conceptual and epistemological premises (White, Citation2018, Citation2019), and that its focus on knowledge developed in disciplinary communities misses the distinctive purpose of education in the arts. In this section, the focus will be on the criticisms of the term's coherence, a critique most notably raised by the philosopher John White. It is hereby asserted that the present author is in agreement with the aforementioned author's overarching assertion that any account of the value of disciplinary knowledge must be justified on grounds external to the account itself. That is to say, said account must be justified on political and normative grounds. In light of the aforementioned points, the following philosophical defence of the recent conception of powerful knowledge offered by Young and Muller is hereby proposed, with reference to the work of Peter Morriss. Morriss has provided one of the most sustained philosophical accounts of the concept of power to date, and, as will be argued here, she helps clarify the importance of the concept.
A notable point of divergence between White and Young pertains to a fundamental question in the philosophy of education: namely, the purpose of schools. White's position is that educational institutions should be firmly grounded in their objectives and principles, with the curriculum serving the pivotal function of promoting these broader political and ethical objectives. In some writings, Young has expressed a greater degree of scepticism with regard to the notion of associating the curriculum with particular social and political objectives. As Young et al. (2014) demonstrate, educational institutions are responsible for facilitating access to specific forms of knowledge. This is taken to be an unnecessary division of the purpose and nature of schooling, as will be argued below.
White has proffered a number of critiques of the notion of powerful knowledge (White, Citation2018, Citation2019). The central argument of this discourse is that the term carries significant emotional weight, thereby legitimising a traditionalist curriculum. In fact, as White argues, when we seek what is 'powerful' in powerful knowledge, we find little of substance. The initial critique concentrated on the assertion that the concept in question entailed a 'sui generis system of interrelated concepts.' White (Citation2018, p. 328) draws attention to the study of literature in schools and argues that students 'rarely if ever get to grips with aestheticians' concepts' such as form and aesthetic value. He further suggests that the 'novelists, dramatists, and poets they read use every day, non-technical' concepts.
Furthermore, he contends that the study of literature does not primarily entail the acquisition of knowledge, but rather constitutes an 'aesthetic experience of various kinds' (White, Citation2018, p. 328). This is a somewhat perplexing assertion, given that White himself had previously stated that students of literature in schools do not grapple with 'aesthetic experience'. It is my understanding that the author is proposing that students of literature primarily engage with texts for their experiential value, and the sheer pleasure that these texts offer, rather than the analytical reading typical of literary theorists and critics. Despite the fact that the initial reading of the claim may be considered somewhat generous, it is nevertheless the case that the claim in question is not found to be convincing. In summary, the question of whether students do in fact learn about concepts such as form and aesthetic experience is an empirical matter. Drawing from my own experience as a longstanding English teacher and head of department, I am convinced that students do indeed learn about these concepts. Secondly, even if it were the case that they do not, it is a separate question whether this is a desirable outcome. It is evident that the argument for a curriculum informed by powerful knowledge is a project with a future orientation, as outlined in Young and Muller's three futures paper (Young & Muller, Citation2010). The intention is not to provide a description of the status quo. It is therefore somewhat counterintuitive that a philosopher who is presumably cognisant of Hume's is/ought distinction would ultimately result in the conflation of the two.
White also objects to the recent reinterpretation of powerful knowledge as a form of potentia. It is important to recall the assertion made by Young and Muller that "potentia 'extends horizons, it imagines new futures … involves the capacity to achieve something of value'." White (2019) identifies an unjustified embellishment of the meaning of potentia, which in fact means 'the power or capacity to do something.' The author goes on to argue that there are numerous actions that could be considered 'powerful' in this sense, and that it would be counterintuitive to refer to them as such. Examples include drinking a glass of water, winking and tying one's shoelaces. It is evident that these are all manifestations of potency; however, it would be a misnomer to designate them as 'powerful'. The proposal by Young and Muller to redefine the concept of 'powerful' as 'potentia' is not successful. This is due to the term being excessively broad and therefore uninformative.
Anticipating a potential response from Young and Muller, White appears to recognise that we might then just be specific about what is powerful within each disciplinary form of knowledge. In their seminal work, Muller and Young proposed that academic subjects should be encouraged to cultivate the capacity to generate new ideas. Nevertheless, White's response to this endeavour to portray disciplinary knowledge as potent remains unenthusiastic. He claims that an individual experiencing mild paranoia may be capable of conceptualising a wide range of novel ideas concerning their surroundings, thereby expanding their cognitive horizons and visualising alternative future outcomes. However, White's critique is missing an important element: the contribution of Young and Muller extends beyond the mere generation of novel concepts in their definition. It is asserted that the generation of ideas is contingent upon the 'deep structure of their subject', thus precipitating the development of 'quality of their discernment and judgement; in their appreciation of the range and reach of the substantive and conceptual fields of the subject; and in their appreciation that the substantive detail they have learnt is but a fraction of what the hinterland of the subject has to offer.' Consequently, paranoid delusions would not be included in this analysis. Nevertheless, the question of the importance of immersion in conceptual fields of subjects remains salient. However, the assertion that any random cognitive power is what Young and Muller advocate appears to be a misrepresentation of their argument.
White's analysis culminates in a critique of Young and Muller's assertion that invoking potentia signifies 'achieving something of value.' In this passage, White posits the notion that the individual possesses the capacity to engage in malevolent actions towards others. The capacity to inflict harm upon others or to exercise domination over them is a possibility that is entertained. White employs Lukes' own supposition that potestia is also a subset of potentia. Once more, White's sustained critique aims to demonstrate that in transitioning towards a conceptualisation of power as 'power-to', we are left with a paucity of substantive substance. The potential for exerting 'power-over' over others remains, as does the banal or arbitrary capacity to perform menial tasks such as browsing the television or conjuring up bizarre and futile concepts. It can be argued that rune reading bestows a certain degree of 'power', yet it is evident that Young and Muller do not perceive this as 'powerful' in the relevant sense. In the following discussion, I propose to utilise a philosophical analysis of power in order to address the aforementioned concerns and to rescue the concept of powerful knowledge from White's critique.
Power reimagined: Peter Morris's theory of power as ability is explored in this study.
It is imperative to establish the fundamental application of power in the English language, as this will provide a crucial foundation for the subsequent discussion. It is important to acknowledge that the impetus behind the undertaking of social realism was the aspiration to evade the dissolution of discourse surrounding knowledge into a mere exchange of power. This tendency is not uncommon in the field of sociology of education. The post-Bourdieuian approach to education has been predicated on the premise that educational institutions function as sites for the reproduction of social inequalities stemming from one's background. In the following section, I will be presenting a series of arguments in response to Michael Young's call for the development of a theory of power that could exist productively alongside the theory of knowledge hitherto developed by social realists.
It is unsurprising that such a theory will need to move away from some of the traditional sociological accounts of power if one considers the concerns of those who have influenced the trajectory of sociological thinking in the sphere of education. The most influential of these thinkers are, to name but three, Bourdieu, Foucault and Marx. A cursory Google search of the term 'power and sociology' returns a number of theories, including 'pluralist', 'elite' and 'ruling class'. These theories are predicated on the understanding that power is relational and involves domination, i.e. 'power-over' others. This manifestation of power, however, does not constitute the fundamental principle under discussion. A compelling analysis of the term 'power' reveals that power is best conceived as 'power-to'. The philosopher who has articulated this position with the greatest clarity and rigour is Peter Morriss, as evidenced in his seminal work on the subject (Morriss, Citation2002). It is evident that Morriss' work has not been referenced within the extant literature on powerful knowledge. However, it is this author's contention that it proffers several concepts and clarifications that may assist in the development of the aforementioned theory of power proposed by Young and Muller.
A notable aspect of Young and Muller's utilisation of Lukes' work on power that remains unacknowledged is the influence of Morriss' contributions to the concept. Morris was the first to recognise that power-to is 'more basic' than power-over and, most importantly, that the latter is not reducible to the former. Morris's analysis commences with a comparison of the terms 'power' and 'influence', which forms the foundation for his subsequent discussion on the distinction between 'power-to' and 'power-over'. This is due to the observation that numerous individuals interested in analysing power in the social world tend to amalgamate the two concepts. Morriss's work aims to demonstrate the analytical distinction between these concepts and to provide compelling conceptual justifications for this distinction. Morris distinguishes between the concepts of 'power' and 'influence', noting that the former 'always refers to a capacity to do things, whilst "influence" sometimes (and typically) does not' (Moore & Muller, Citation2002, p. 12). Influence, on the other hand, is defined as a 'specific form of affecting.' Morris's conclusion that power is best understood as 'an ability, capacity or dispositional property' (Moore & Muller, Citation2002, p. 13) is therefore supported by this evidence.
One method of elucidating this phenomenon is to examine the verbs that both words typically take. The term "influence" is understood to denote the act of exerting a force or impact on a particular entity, whereas the term "power" is used to denote the ability to produce an effect or outcome. As Morris notes, 'to affect something is to alter it or impinge on it in some way … to effect something is to bring about or accomplish it' (Moore & Muller, Citation2002, p. 29). This suggests that exerting influence over an individual or entity does not inherently constitute an exercise of power; rather, the true demonstration of power lies in the actualisation of a desired outcome. A comparison can be drawn between the assertion that 'the divorce affected him emotionally for many years' and the statement that 'the divorce affected his recovery from depression'. This elucidates the fallacy of perceiving power as the primary function of influence. Power-over can be defined as the ability to perform an action that also has an impact on another person or group. Accordingly, it may be posited that this is not an essential component of power; rather, it is a specific illustration of it. It is evident that there are numerous phenomena within our purview that possess the capacity to exert influence yet do not inherently incorporate the element of "affecting" within their conceptual frameworks. The assertion that I possess the capacity to author this article signifies the ability to influence a desired outcome. It would be an anomalous interpretation to frame this in terms of power over others. Should the objective be to engender a state of ennui in the reader, it could be argued that there is an element of power in the text, although this would be an exceptional usage.
In the subsequent stage of his theoretical development, Morriss transitions to the consideration of power as a dispositional property. Dispositional properties are defined as 'relatively enduring capacities of objects' (Moore & Muller, Citation2002, p. 14). This is distinct from the events themselves. The capacity for a seed to develop into a plant is intrinsic, irrespective of whether it ultimately flourishes. To illustrate this point, consider the example of a sugar lump. Such a lump is soluble irrespective of its current state of dissolution, and this property persists even in the absence of any external liquid media. In the event of powers being considered as dispositional capacities to perform an act with the intention of doing so, it is recognised that the actual performance of said act by an individual is of negligible relevance in the analysis of their powers. Morris has described the conflation of the exercise of a power—for example, dissolving in water or blooming into a rose—with the disposition to do so as the exercise fallacy. Morriss (2019) highlights that social scientists have been prone to committing this fallacy as they seek to quantify and measure power. However, it is important to note that if power is defined as a disposition, it is, by definition, separate from its exercise. In conclusion, it is important to note the distinction between the conceptualisations of power and other related ideas, such as influence, control, and domination. These latter forms of 'power-over' should not be regarded as the primary means through which power is to be conceptualised. Instead, we should follow Morriss in recognizing that power-to is the fundamental form of the concept. The concept of power-to is predicated on the capacity to influence specific outcomes, as opposed to exerting influence over all outcomes.
A re-examination of the notion of power and knowledge.
By delineating these distinctions, we can now redirect our attention to the concept of powerful knowledge and some of the concerns regarding its fundament as a concept useful for conceptualising educational knowledge. As White asserts, there exists a plethora of entities which, upon consideration, may not be deemed deserving of the modifier 'powerful'. Consequently, reliance on the extensive concept of potentia offers limited insight. Nevertheless, the pivotal issue is that the knowledge incorporated within a school curriculum bestows authority by fostering dispositions among students. It is evident that disparate subjects engender divergent forms of competence, which concomitantly intersect. For instance, mathematical aptitude may be applicable to the natural sciences, while musical sensitivity and intonation may be advantageous in both music and dance. However, once acquired, these dispositions become the subjects of analysis in Morriss' work on power.
Morris's work is further important in that it refines one of the key motivators for the project of powerful knowledge in the first place. It is important to note the distinction between the knowledge of the powerful and powerful knowledge. It is evident that Young and Muller do not explore power as a dispositional concept; however, such an exploration would serve to clarify the conceptual justification of the dyad. Muller and Young posit that the possession of knowledge regarding powerful entities does not constitute genuine understanding. Instead, they argue that this understanding encompasses the utilisation of that knowledge, its origins, and the interests of the entities responsible for its creation or utilisation. However, it can be argued that this is not a case of power in itself; rather, it is the exercise of power-over. The supposition of power in this context would constitute the aforementioned exercise fallacy.
Conversely, the possession of knowledge is more aptly conceptualised as a manifestation of domination, itself a constituent element of power-over. The manner in which elite groups utilise knowledge to consolidate their positions of domination, thereby subjugating those lacking access to it, is, according to my analysis, distinctly divergent from the concept of powerful knowledge. The term 'powerful' in the context of 'powerful knowledge' signifies an inclination to perform specific actions derivatively of having access to disciplinary knowledge. It is evident that the term "knowledge of the powerful" is a specific delineation of an exercise of domination. Consequently, it does not signify true power in the relevant sense. Elaborating on this conceptual distinction provides insight into the significance of the concept of powerful knowledge.
It is evident that, in the context of the powerful, the relevant sense of 'powerful' is the initial one ascribed by Lukes. Consequently, it would be more precise to express this as knowledge of the dominant. While this alternative formulation is less evocative, it is more precise. As both Lukes and Morriss now agree, discourse on power in the social sciences is really discourse on domination. Furthermore, it is imperative to acknowledge the distinction between the power-over concept and the notion of domination. Lukes provides an example of a teacher in a power-over relationship with their students, but not necessarily one of domination. This is the case if the teacher is a good teacher, as opposed to a tyrannical or vindictive one. The crux of the argument is that the act of domination is inherently linked to the devaluation or exploitation of an individual. It is evident that the concept with which Young is concerned in developing the notion of the knowledge of the powerful is now quite distant from the concept of power. This distance is the fundamental cause of the profound disparity between the possession of knowledge by the powerful and the knowledge of the powerful. Morris advances a parallel argument when asserting that Lukes's discourse does not pertain to power in the conventional sense; rather, it concerns the practical implementation of domination, a concept that is distinct from the notion of power. Power is defined as an ability or a capacity. The fundamental question posed by Lukes is as follows: 'How do those in positions of power ensure the compliance of those they dominate?' This is not a question concerning potestas (the capacity to dominate). The issue pertains to the actualisation of domination, which signifies the implementation of a capacity rather than the capacity itself. This is analogous to Young's knowledge of the powerful, where 'powerful' refers to those that do in fact exercise domination over others.
It is now possible to reach a consensus with White on the issue of the precise nature of the powers cultivated by the study of subjects such as mathematics, history, French, music and English literature. However, it is imperative for individuals with expertise in various subject areas to make this explicit to themselves and their students. In undertaking this course of action, they bring the powers of their respective disciplines to the forefront of their practice. This necessitates a discussion about why the powers of knowledge, promoted by school subjects, are valuable for individuals and society. In this passage, White appears to concur with the assertion that this constitutes a project that warrants further exploration. He further elaborates on this point by stating, 'They need to go further than the definition they propose. The present study indicates that further progress is required in order to ascertain the elements that render the subject knowledge in which Young and his colleagues are interested as powerful knowledge.
It is my view that Young and Muller, as curriculum theorists, are working at a level of abstraction that precludes them from providing a detailed response to this question. The onus is on subject specialists, practitioners, and disciplinary communities to address this issue. Undoubtedly, the level of contestation will vary across different domains; however, this should not deter the pursuit of such an account. Moreover, the notion of power must be anchored to a political and normative understanding of its purpose. It is my supposition that White would concur with this assessment. He has himself proposed an educational paradigm that is linked to aims and values.
It is evident that Young and his collaborators have not adequately emphasised the significance of cultivating powerful knowledge for society. However, as previously indicated, this does not appear to fall within the scope of their responsibilities. It is imperative to establish a conception of justice that is applicable to the domain of education. In addition, an account is required that elucidates the extent to which the various domains of potential powerful knowledge are or are not aligned with this objective. In this respect, the present author concurs with the recent contributions from Deng and Lambert that seek to establish a correlation with the Capabilities Approach, a concept that was originally advanced by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. The present endeavour entails the engagement of a programme of profound knowledge in discourse with the domain of political philosophy, with the objective of facilitating the formulation of a genuine programme for educational transformation.
Conclusion
The objective of social realism was to circumvent both crass positivism and reductive relativism with regard to knowledge. In doing so, it provides a social account of knowledge, acknowledging the significance of specialisation, differentiation and objectivity. This phenomenon confers upon specific forms of knowledge the capacity to transcend their local and particular contexts, thereby attaining a universal dimension. The concept of power as knowledge is a significant theoretical framework that facilitates the analysis of this project within the context of schooling.
However, in articulating the concept, its authors struggled to give an account applicable to many arts and humanities subjects. This is attributable to the initial tacit reliance of Young and Muller on hierarchical and vertically structured disciplines as the paradigm case of powerful knowledge. In response, the focus shifted towards comprehending the notion of 'power' in relation to the term 'powerful knowledge'. Rather than conceptualising 'powerful knowledge' as a property of the knowledge itself, it was understood as a capacity or faculty inherent in the individual. The present study utilised Steven Lukes' seminal work on the concept of power to analyse the phenomenon. In response to some of White's criticisms, it has been suggested that the concept could be further enriched by utilising Peter Morriss' work on power, particularly with regard to the distinction between knowledge of the powerful and powerful knowledge. This provides a framework within which curriculum designers, educators, and subject specialists can articulate the 'power' their respective disciplines engender. The present author is aware of some of the work in this area, for example in the Geocapabilities project. In the current era, characterised by escalating de-professionalisation, centralisation and instrumentalism, the necessity for such a project is paramount. It has the potential to offer a much-needed counterbalance to the prevailing trends, thereby providing a valuable source of support to those who seek to advocate for the significance of subject-based education in the pursuit of enhanced social justice.
